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Abstract 
 
Car ownership in many large cities of the developing world is rapidly increasing with rising 
incomes, and is accompanied by traffic gridlock, travel delays, and deteriorating air quality. The 
policy of congestion pricing to manage growing travel demand has been implemented with 
varying degrees of success in some developed countries.  This thesis explores the applicability of 
congestion pricing in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA). 
 
Current transportation policies in the MCMA were studied, with an analysis of the factors causing 
increased demand for private transport. Of the many forms in which congestion pricing may be 
implemented, we focused on the possibility of a central city congestion zone similar to that 
recently implemented in the city of London, providing arguments for its viability, and preliminary 
analyses regarding potential impacts. We studied how household level car ownership had 
changed for different income groups in Mexico City between 1994 and 2000, in order to make 
empirical estimates of the distributional impacts that a congestion pricing scheme might have. 
Our results show that the location of low income car owning households far from the central 
areas, and their limited access to efficient public transport creates negative consequences for 
them. Yet, significant overall reductions in traffic and travel time savings are possible with a 
congestion charge. Lower income people can benefit if the revenues from congestion pricing are 
used to improve their accessibility to public transport.  
 
Congestion pricing is difficult to implement, especially given the decentralization and 
overlapping levels of political authority in the MCMA. As part of this research, we surveyed 
various Mexican government officials, academics, researchers, and practitioners interested in 
improving transportation and air quality in the region. The survey shows that there is hesitation in 
considering any such policy in the MCMA without prior improvements in public transport.  
 
In light of these findings, we have outlined the complicated issues surrounding implementation, 
with recommendations for a course of action given the current policy agenda. The findings 
presented in this thesis can be used by decision makers in Mexico City to design a set of policies 
for improving mobility, with a better understanding of the issues surrounding congestion pricing.   
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CHAPTER 1.           INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Context 
Traffic congestion is a growing problem affecting people’s quality of life in large cities, 
in both developed and developing countries. With growing car ownership, increasing 
distances traveled, and rapidly saturating road capacity, cities are faced with the dilemma 
of either imposing controls on automobiles, or suffering congestion.  
 
The economic costs of congestion, in terms of time and money, are undoubtedly high. In 
its latest report on urban mobility in the United States, researchers at the Texas 
Transportation Institute used indicators from the 75 largest cities in the country to reveal 
alarming statistics. They estimated that congestion costs were $69.5 billion in the US in 
2001, in terms of 5.7 billion gallons of wasted fuel and 3.5 billion hours of lost 
productivity resulting from traffic jams1. This cost had risen about 7% from the previous 
year. This is in spite of the fact that the United States has the second highest number of 
kilometers of major roads per 1000 persons in the world, next only to Canada.  
 
In most large cities of the developing world, transportation demand and consequent road 
congestion have already reached a critical stage.  Yet, governments are stalling in 
implementing policy and planning measures to deal with this situation for a number of 
reasons.  One is the lack of sufficient resources to make large infrastructure investments.  
Another reason is the lack of institutional coordination between agencies responsible for 
financing, managing and operating urban transport.   A third reason is the lack of political 
will to control private vehicle demand, given that it is usually the most influential socio-
economic groups that have the largest share of private travel demand, and the highest trip 
rate.  Thus, automobile ownership is growing with increasing population size and rising 
income in developing cities, leading to unsustainable motorization rates.   
 
                                                 
1 Lomax and Schrank (2003) 
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Other problems in cities of the developing world, such as increasing green house gas 
concentrations, air pollution, high accident rates, and urban sprawl, are all fallouts of 
rapid motorization, with more serious long-term consequences.  These cities are highly 
populated, financially constrained, dense and heavily built-up.   Therefore, the answer 
lies not only in building more infrastructure but rather, in managing existing road space 
with more discretion.  Along with making investments to manage the existing transport 
infrastructure and services, improved methods of financing these investments must also 
be deployed.  Congestion pricing is a policy of charging private vehicle users for the 
costs of transportation facilities provided to them at public expense, and it therefore helps 
raise revenues for a city.    
 
The concept of congestion charging or value pricing involves rationing road space 
through pricing in order to distribute travel demand more evenly across available road 
capacity and times of day.  It involves charging a fee for the use of existing infrastructure 
such that those who value it more end up paying more.  The revenues raised can be spent 
to improve public transport in the city to accommodate those car drivers who change their 
travel behavior and move to public transport as their mode of choice, or drive at a 
different time of day.  Singapore was the first country in the world to attempt this policy 
through its Area Licensing Scheme (ALS). Established in 1975, the scheme allowed 
private vehicles to enter congested downtown areas in the morning peak hours only if 
they had purchased an Area License.   Changes have constantly been made to the system 
and since 1998 it has been upgraded to an Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system to allow 
differential charging according to time of day, traffic speed, location, and evolving traffic 
conditions.  For this, all private vehicles are fitted with transponders that allow automatic 
deduction of charges when the vehicle is driven under gantries installed on certain 
corridors.  
 
Congestion pricing is a part of policies under the broader category of road pricing. There 
are other examples where urban road pricing has been implemented, such as in the cities 
of Norway and the United Kingdom.  The Norwegian cities did not charge people for 
congestion to start with.  The fee began as a toll to finance the roads, but is now being 
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modified to become a congestion charge.  After close to three decades, the only other 
large city to successfully implement this policy is London.  Congestion charging was 
implemented in London in February 2003, as an area-based scheme.   
 
As part of the scheme, vehicles entering Central London during the major part of the day 
on weekdays are charged a flat daily fee.  When they enter the congestion charging zone, 
their license plate numbers are read by cameras installed along the zone periphery and 
within it.  Vehicle owners have to register their vehicles in advance and have to pay the 
charge when they enter the zone.   
 
Many large cities of the world that suffer the same congestion problems as London have 
been keenly observing the London experience.  The scheme is currently regarded as a 
success in reducing road congestion and travel delays. Moreover, the mayor who 
implemented it, Ken Livingstone, has recently been re-elected for another term (June 
2004), confirming the political viability of the scheme. The first year of implementation 
of the London Congestion Charging Scheme has provided a valuable opportunity to 
observe the short-term impacts of the policy. However, since England is a high-income 
country, the lessons from London are not directly applicable to a developing country 
case.  It is worth investigating congestion pricing for cities in the developing world 
because the policy presents an opportunity for those developing countries with adequate 
financial and staff resources to "leapfrog" forward in solving their urban transport 
problems.   
1.2.  Motivation 
Mobility is a key determinant of personal and economic productivity in congested urban 
areas.  Worldwide travel demand has grown to the extent that the global transportation 
sector is likely to become the leading user of non-renewable energy resources over the 
next 20 years. Statistics show that between now and 2020, the energy demand for 
transport is expected to grow by approximately 1.5 per cent per year in industrialized 
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countries and by 3.6 per cent per year in developing countries, with fossil fuels 
dominating 90% of the increase in demand2.  
 
Correlations between per capita GDP and the amount of passenger car travel per capita, 
drawn by the International Energy Agency for many countries show that growth in 
transport demand is closely linked with income growth.  Especially, in the developing 
world, demand for private motorized transport expressed by say, per capita kilometers 
traveled, is steadily on the rise, with few, if any, signs of saturation.   
 
This current pattern of travel behavior is inducing rapid suburbanization in less developed 
regions of the world, following the paradigm of industrialized countries.  It has resulted 
in the emergence of huge but less dense cities, or cities that have developed multiple 
business districts that have grown parallel to, and in some cases, much faster than the 
central business districts.  Increasing investments are made to service this growth with 
more road links.   The lower density and more polycentric character of cities is leading to 
higher trip rates for passengers and freight over longer trip distances.  Many cities in the 
developing world are struggling with the rapid growth in their fleets of motorized 
vehicles, and exactly how they address the rising demand for urban transport will have 
important implications for their environment and economic productivity.  In this regard, 
congestion pricing can be a promising method to achieve many goals that the largest 
developing cities, such as Mexico City, are trying to fulfill with respect to sustainable 
urban transport.  Chief among these are: 
 
1) Stabilizing motorization rate – Different travel demand management measures such 
as creating exclusive public transport and pedestrian zones, increasing car ownership 
costs, and pricing, usually help restrict use of private automobiles.  These measures 
can in the longer term also facilitate reduction in the rate of growth of motorization. 
Pricing has equity impacts that can be balanced by investing he revenues generated 
from higher income drivers to improve public transport for lower income users.   
                                                 
2 International Energy Agency (2002) 
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2) Reducing pollution from emissions - Increasing motorization is directly responsible 
for rising pollution in these cities.  Deterring people from using private vehicles 
through imposing charges can reduce emissions and greenhouse gas concentrations 
too.  This is especially important for Mexico City, which is amongst the most polluted 
cities in the world. Of course, as will be explained later in this thesis, the difficulty 
lies in convincing people of the benefits of not driving a car they have already bought. 
3) Encouraging use of public transport – It is widely recognized that a high quality 
public transport system is essential to improve mobility, and to limit the growth rate 
of private vehicles by providing an efficient travel alternative.  Large cities in the 
developing world are increasingly investing in state-of-the-art public transport 
systems such as Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) or Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) that will 
require maintenance and capacity enhancements in the future.  Congestion pricing can 
provide funds for implementing and expanding public transport projects.  A new BRT 
project has recently been approved in Mexico City too.  
4) Increasing financial capability to invest in public infrastructure – Many 
developing cities are aided by international donors or multilateral agencies in building 
public infrastructure.   But in cities where economic growth is high, privatization is 
changing the trend.  Public-private partnerships are commonly established for 
financing infrastructure projects.  Congestion pricing operations can easily fall into 
this type of partnership, while increasing the city’s revenues to invest in public 
infrastructure.  
 
The problem remains that there are no precedents of the policy in the developing world.  
The long-standing case of Singapore and the recent experience of London demonstrate 
that these area-based pricing schemes have had successful results.  However, we can only 
draw some guidance from these cases.  Most of the problems that will be encountered in 
implementing a congestion charge in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) have 
not risen prominently in the cases of London or Singapore.   
 
First of all, the lack of efficient public transport, especially buses, would create negative 
distributive impacts of a pricing policy for lower and middle-income households in the 
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MCMA. Another prominent issue is that of an equity imbalance, whereby a poor person 
would spend a higher proportion of income on a congestion charge than a rich person, to 
access the same area of a city. The equity consideration also arises because it is lower 
income people who usually live farther away from centers of employment and they are 
forced to own and drive cars in the absence of other alternatives. Other conditions likely 
to impact implementation are conflicting institutional bodies, jurisdictions and decision-
making powers.  In developing countries, the resources to execute a pricing scheme 
would usually compete with other causes deemed to be more important, especially with 
regards to political will.  In addition, enforcement of traffic laws and registration 
procedures is limited.  
 
A unique factor in Mexico City is the significance of privately operated fixed route public 
minibuses or colectivos that enjoy high passenger mode share. There is a feeling of 
insecurity associated with using these minibuses, the Metro and even taxis. In addition, 
the current policy agenda favors construction of additional road space to accommodate 
the ever-increasing private vehicles and colectivos in the city.  All these factors spin off 
many issues regarding public acceptability of congestion pricing.   
 
The aim of this research, therefore, is to explore congestion pricing as part of a set of 
policy actions to manage the growth and use of private automobiles in Mexico City. 
Congestion and travel delays affect quality of life in a significant way; similarly air 
quality has important impacts on public health and mortality. Recognizing that 70% of 
the air pollution in Mexico City is attributed to the transportation sector, this research 
may offer an approach to deal with the two externalities of congestion and pollution with 
one idea. 
1.3.  Assumptions and Hypothesis 
We begin with the assumption that theoretically, congestion pricing is a viable idea to 
reduce the negative impacts of high motorization, travel delays and congested traffic.  
This is based on the notion that road space is yet another infrastructure resource provided 
to people at public cost that tends to be over-exploited. Given that people pay for their 
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water supply, electricity supply, and telecommunications services according to the level 
of use, it is possible that user fees can similarly be charged for better traffic conditions 
and road use.  If such a policy is in place, people will pay only for the number of times 
they drive into the most congested parts of a city.  If they choose to do this everyday, they 
will pay more.  If they choose to car pool or use public transport for the days that they 
don’t necessarily need the flexibility, then they will pay less.   
In case of congestion pricing, people pay for intangible entities such as a smoother flow 
of traffic and reduced travel delays, as against utilities such as water, electricity, gas, and 
so on, where they pay for something tangible.  However, because people are accustomed 
to using road space for free, road pricing is bound to generate opposition.  If a charge for 
driving into downtown areas had been in force from the start, first of all, traffic 
conditions would not be as critical as they are today, and second, less utility would be 
attached to car ownership than at present.  Since a free resource is always over-exploited, 
traffic congestion has been intensifying in recent years, and drastic measures to manage it 
have now become imperative.  This is especially true in fast-growing cities of the 
developing world where motorization rates are growing rapidly due to the perception that 
owning a car is a status symbol, and due to the poor condition of public transport.  
 
In this study, we address issues of how applicable congestion pricing is in the developing 
world, keeping the distributive impacts in mind.  The hypothesis is that despite the 
problems described above, the policy is bound to result in many benefits and can be 
implemented in an equitable way. This would be as part of a package of complementary 
measures that is politically feasible.  What is equitable is subjective of course.  But if it 
can be proved from a particular policy design that the net economic benefit to the city, 
especially from the point of view of the disadvantaged sections of the population, is 
higher than the monetary, time, and inconvenience costs incurred, then we would be 
closer to a social optimum.  A carefully considered value for the congestion charge, 
redistribution methods, user-friendly charge payment technology and public transport 
improvements must be adopted as part of the package of measures, for a more acceptable 
implementation of congestion pricing in developing world cities.  
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The MIT Integrated Program on Urban, Global and Regional Air Pollution has supported 
research on road-based public transport (Darido) and transit-oriented development (Gilat) 
in Mexico City. This thesis deals with a package of measures centered on congestion 
pricing that complements these research themes. 
1.4. Thesis Objectives 
1) To explore the applicability of congestion pricing in Mexico City by understanding 
potential benefits and constraints to implementation  
2) To determine how congestion pricing might fit within the current transport policy and 
planning agenda, with an emphasis on building public and political acceptability.  
3) To recommend complementary measures, institutional responsibilities, and use of 
revenue.  
4) To assess possible distributive impacts by anticipating the responses of stakeholders. 
1.5. Research Questions 
Since there is no successful example of congestion pricing in developing economies, the 
questions addressed in this thesis provide a model of inquiry for other cities.  These 
include:  
 What are the factors causing high motorization and traffic congestion in Mexico City? 
Would congestion pricing be effective in improving urban transport?  If so, what are 
the potential impacts? 
 What are the different ways in which congestion pricing has been implemented 
around the world, and what would be the best option for Mexico City? 
 How can congestion pricing be packaged with other policy measures to address 
equity issues, implementation challenges, and to produce long term benefits?  
 How can the various stakeholder interests be addressed to make the policy publicly 
and politically acceptable in Mexico City? 
 
We begin by studying the city’s urban context and key transportation indicators, 
described in the next section. 
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1.6. Contribution to Existing Literature 
There is a large body of existing literature on the theoretical principles of congestion 
pricing, its various distributive impacts, and the challenges to implementing it.  However, 
practical applications are very few, with the key examples being in Singapore, London, 
the Norwegian cities of Oslo, Trondheim and Bergen, and the examples of High 
Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes in San Diego and other North American cities.  These 
schemes differ considerably in their features and implementation.  The characteristics of 
the urban areas they are applied in are also very varied.  All these cases are based in cities 
of the developed world and most have been well documented, permitting analysis.  This 
is especially true of the London scheme that is under observation by many other cities, 
such as Paris, in order to draw lessons for designing a similar policy.  
 
However, there is no literature that draws lessons from these schemes, seeks to alter and 
adapt them, and ascertain the feasibility of implementation in the more challenging 
context of a mega-city in the developing world.  The Mexico City Metropolitan Area 
(MCMA), for example, has a population size that is about triple that of London, far fewer 
local government resources, and more critical levels of traffic congestion due to mixed 
modes on the streets.  It has high traffic-related air pollution and a vehicle fleet that is 
growing at a very fast rate.  The institutional responsibilities are conflicting, and the 
current policy agenda favors the construction of more road space to fulfill growing 
demand, rather than policies to manage excessive travel demand.  It has been proved time 
and again and in varied contexts that adding more road space only leads to temporary and 
short-term congestion relief.  In the medium and longer term, it induces more demand 
and fuels the need for more infrastructure.  This is clearly not a sustainable path to 
follow; yet the high visibility of large infrastructure projects usually makes them lucrative 
for building a political agenda or campaign.  
 
Given these challenges, this thesis shows how congestion pricing might be applicable in 
the context of Mexico City, with recommendations for how it might be implemented.  
Urban areas in the developing world may be most in need of policies such as congestion 
pricing, yet the policy has not been explored in these contexts due to the implementation 
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challenges anticipated, and the lack of data.  This thesis will contribute to the current 
body of literature in that it will provide the first such study for the MCMA, and will be 
among the few studies done for a developing city.  Many large developing cities have the 
same social, economic, institutional and political environment as Mexico City, thus this 
research can provide some direction for similar work in other contexts.   
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON 
MEXICO CITY 
 
With a population of 18 million today, the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) is 
considered one of the four largest urbanized areas in the world, along with New York 
City, Tokyo and Mumbai. Unofficial estimates of the MCMA’s total population size are 
even higher, going up to 20 million.  
 
The city exemplifies the “leviathan”3 nature of many metropolises in the developing 
world that are growing rapidly in size, scale and population. The term ”mega-city” has 
also been used to describe the Mexico City Metropolitan Area that includes within it the 
16 delegaciones (or boroughs) of the Federal District (Distrito Federal - DF), 37 
urbanized municipalities from the surrounding State of Mexico (Estado de Mexico - EM) 
and one municipality from the state of Hidalgo. The DF and the EM both have their own 
self-governing administrations. The Federal District (DF) is considered the central 
business district of the region and contains the historic city center, the Zocalo.  
 
The MCMA is situated in a valley, at an average altitude of 2,286 meters, covering an 
area of 4,945 square kilometers. The high altitude causes incomplete fuel combustion, 
while the surrounding mountains impede air circulation to make the MCMA an air 
pollution sink of sorts. The complete sphere of influence of the MCMA, referred to as the 
“megalopolis” by Molina and Molina (2002), extends to about 75 to 150 kilometers from 
the city center, and includes six cities that surround the MCMA in a ring known as the 
corona or crown. These include Puebla, Tlaxcala, Cuernavaca, Cuautla, Pachuca, and 
Toluca, all of which are metropolises themselves. The megalopolis has a total population 
of 25 million, representing over a quarter of the nation’s population4. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Davis (1994). “Urban Leviathan” is the term used by Davis to describe Mexico City in the Twentieth 
Century. 
4 Molina, Molina and Alliance for Global Sustainability (2002) 
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  FIGURE 2-1 Map of the MCMA as part of a Megalopolis 
 
 
  
       Mexico City Metropolitan Area Boundary  
         State Boundaries 
Source: General Census of Population and Housing, INEGI, 1990 
 
2.1. Population Growth Trend 
 
Population in the MCMA is growing at an average rate of 2% per annum and is estimated 
to reach 26 million by the year 2020. The DF has a 30% share of the entire urbanized 
area of the MCMA5 but had only 0.3% average annual growth in population between 
1995 and 2000. In contrast, the suburban municipalities in the State of Mexico (EM) had 
about 3% population growth in the same period with most of the growth occurring in the 
municipalities north and east of the DF6. This high suburban growth is expected to 
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5 Molina and Molina (2002) 
6 COMETRAVI (1999) 
increase further in the years to come. While the absolute population of the MCMA has 
almost tripled between 1970 and 2000, increasing by 195%, the urban land area increased 
even more, by 226%7. Thus, more people are spread over a larger urban area today.  
Figure 2-2 shows the growth of the metropolitan area as it has expanded into the 
surrounding State of Mexico. 
FIGURE 2-2 Growth of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Presentation by Mario Molina, Seventh Workshop on Air Quality in Mexico City, 2004 
 
The DF and EM had roughly an equal share of the population in 1995, but by the year 
2020, the EM’s share is expected to be double that of the DF. The city center lost 
population at the rate of about 2% between 1970 and 19958. The rapid decentralization in 
the MCMA since 1960 is evident from the loss of population from the central city to the 
suburban areas in the State of Mexico as shown in Figure 2-3. 
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7 Villegas-Lopez (2001) 
8 Molina and Molina (2002) 
FIGURE 2-3 Percentage Share of Population in EM and DF 
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Source: www.demographia.com - last accessed on April 13, 2004 
For a list of delegaciones constituting the Core, Inner and Outer DF areas, please see Appendix 3. 
 
In spite of this trend, overall average urban density in the MCMA is high at about 12,000 
persons per square kilometer. The figure for urban density actually ranges between 5,000 
and 15,000 persons per square kilometer, usually reducing with increasing distance from 
the Zocalo (central city). However, some high-density areas are located much further 
away9 because roughly 62% of the MCMA’s population is concentrated in irregular low-
income settlements typically occurring on the city’s outskirts. 
2.2. Urban Structure and Expansion 
 
Decentralization of Mexico City has been exacerbated in recent years due to many 
causes10. One reason is the environmental degradation, particularly atmospheric pollution 
and traffic congestion in the central areas that has increasingly caused more affluent 
people to leave the city since the 1980s. Increasing commercial activity accompanied by 
high land-values is another cause of decline in the central city’s population. Land values 
                                                 
9 Gakenheimer and Zegras (2003) 
10 Connolly (1999).  Apparently, decentralizing Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey figured as a goal 
in national urban development programs since the first one, in 1976, with the reasoning that the as more 
people moved out of the core of the city, it would result in more sustainable urban development with 
improved environmental conditions. 
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have become very high in these parts and are on average about three times higher than 
those in the periphery of the DF. Lower income households, especially, cannot remain in 
the central city and are forced to build or rent homes in peripheral areas. After an 
earthquake devastated Mexico City in 1985, the DF government undertook major 
reconstruction of the central areas, providing subsidized low-income housing, still these 
areas are losing population.    
 
The government’s General Program of Urban Development for the DF11 describes four 
distinct zones of current and future development. These include the city center at the 
core, which will remain the center of business and services. The first ring around it 
represents a high quality and well-serviced zone, the second ring represents a transitional 
zone, and the third ring is essentially a rural zone fast becoming part of the metropolitan 
area. At present, population of the MCMA is concentrated within the first ring, but the 
outer rings are experiencing the fastest growth.  
2.3. Economic Characteristics and Income Distribution 
 
The per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the MCMA has been estimated at about 
US $7,500 in the year 2000, contributing a third of the GDP of the country12. The 
MCMA’s economy shifted significantly from manufacturing activities to services. In 
1998, 76% of the MCMA’s GDP was generated in the services sector, followed by 19% 
generated through industrial activities. 70% of the labor force of the MCMA works in the 
services sector, 29% in manufacturing and 1% in the agricultural sector13. Income 
disparities in the metropolitan area are high, and the wealthiest 10% of the population 
possesses 20 times more income than the poorest 10%25. The DF has GDP per capita 
about three times higher than the EM26.  In comparison with Mexico’s average GDP per 
capita, the DF’s GDP per capita was 135% higher, while the EM’s was 19% lower15. 
                                                 
11 SEDUVI (1996) 
12 Villegas-Lopez (2000) 
13 Ibid. 
25 Gakenheimer and Zegras (2003) 
26 INEGI (2000) - GDP per capita in the DF in the year 2000 was US$$13,089, nearly three times higher 
than that in the EM (US$$4,542) 
15 Bracamontes (2003) 
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In addition, there is a clear pattern of socio-economic spatial segregation, with lower 
income households occupying mostly the north and east parts of the city and wealthier 
households occupying the south and southwest parts. Major shopping centers are located 
in the west and southwest parts, while the relatively poorer north and east parts in the 
State of Mexico have a higher concentration of industries, less access to services and 
more traditional commercial areas16. Figure 2-4 shows this pattern. 
FIGURE 2-4 Land Use in the MCMA (1997) 
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16 Gakenheimer and Zegras (2003) 
On comparing Figure 2-5 below with the land use map in the previous figure, it is evident 
that most lower income households are located to the northwest and northeast of the 
CBD, in parts of the State of Mexico where the industries are concentrated.  
 
FIGURE 2-5 Spatial Segregation by Income in the MCMA (1990)17 
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17 Schteingart (2000) 
2.4. Transportation Infrastructure and Travel Demand in the MCMA  
 
In Mexico City, there is a stark disparity in the availability of transportation infrastructure 
between the Federal District (DF) and the State of Mexico (EM). This is true for public 
and private transport. For example, available data show that the annual investment in 
transportation infrastructure in the DF was US $1000 million in 1992, while it was only 
US $80 million in the EM18. Table 2-1 below clearly illustrates this disparity. 
TABLE 2-1 Summary of Transport Infrastructure in the MCMA 
Type DF EM 
Primary Roads 198.4 kms (67% controlled access) 352 kms highways 
“Ejes” Viales 310 kms 47 kms (Vías Rápidas Urbanas) 
Principal Roads 552.5 kms 616 kms 
Secondary Roads 8,000 kms (8150) 250 
Metro 178 kms - 
Trolleybus 377 kms - 
Light Rail 26 kms (13 in each direction) - 
Parking spaces 126,257 spaces (10,000 lots) N/A 
Parking Meters 1,535  
Bus shelters 2,347 290 
Contra-flow lanes 13 lanes/186 km  
 
Source: COMETRAVI (1999)19 
 
Since the DF area contains the historic city center with old, narrow streets, it suffers from 
chronic traffic congestion. In addition, infrastructure investments have not kept pace with 
the growth in population and the more rapid growth in motorized vehicles. The DF and 
the EM have their own vehicle registration databases, both of which are poorly 
maintained, so estimates of the total vehicle fleet vary, even among the different 
government agencies. The total number of vehicles in the city range from 3 to 3.2 
million, with cars making up 72% of the fleet, vans and pickups comprising 20% and the 
rest made up of buses and trucks. The percentage of cars in the fleet has been rapidly 
increasing with rising personal wealth, growing at a rate much faster than population 
growth.   
 
                                                 
18 Connolly (1999) 
19 Molina and Molina (2002). p. 230. 
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The yearly vehicle fleet has grown at the rate of 10% in the period from 1976-1996, and 
according to census data from the year 2000, 40% of households in the DF and 30% of 
those in the EM owned at least one car or small van. The motorization rate in this period 
grew from 78 cars per thousand inhabitants to 166 cars per thousand inhabitants, 
increasing by over 5% per year20.  
FIGURE 2-6 Motorization index in the MCMA 
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indicators in a hundred cities around the world revealed that Mexico City has the highe
car density rate in the continent, with 353 passenger cars per kilometer of roadway. This 
is much higher than Los Angeles, which has one of the highest density rates in the United
States, with 141 cars/km. It is thus, not surprising that Mexico City is also considered one 
of the most polluted cities in the world, with an annual carbon monoxide exposure level 
of 152 kg/person, compared with 106.7 kg/person for Los Angeles . 
 
A
externality costs are currently estimated to be $7 billion, with 85% of the costs at
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20 SETRAVI – Comprehensive Program for Traffic and Transport, 2001-2010 
21 UITP (2003) 
to traffic congestion and accidents.  COMETRAVI’s study22 has revealed other indicators 
of high congestion levels.  74% of road intersections in the city are very congested (LOS 
F – the highest grade possible, showing traffic flows in excess of road capacity), with 
speeds below 20 kilometers per hour during peak hours.  Average vehicle speeds in some 
parts are reported to be as low as 9 kilometers per hour23.  
 
Public transportation, in the form of buses and the Metro, is most accessible in the central 
areas of the Federal District, with the municipalities of the State of Mexico facing limited 
access.  The chief transportation options available to people in the EM are either private 
automobiles, or the low capacity privately operated minibuses called colectivos. It is the 
rapid increase in private automobiles and growth in colectivo traffic that has contributed 
most to traffic congestion in Mexico City, especially on the routes leading from the EM 
to the DF and on multiple nodes within the DF.  The number of colectivos has increased 
due to the failure of the bus system and lack of growth in the Metro network in recent 
years.  Figure 2-7 shows that the colectivos currently have the largest passenger trip mode share 
in the city. 
 
FIGURE 2-7 Motorized Mode Share of Passenger Trips in the MCMA (1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gakenheimer and Zegras(2003) 
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22 COMETRAVI (1999) 
23 Cervero (1998) 
The following figure shows the evolution of mode shares in Mexico City in the last two 
decades, showing a significant shift from medium and high-capacity modes to low-
capacity modes. 
FIGURE 2-8 Evolution of Mode Shares in the DF (%) 
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2.5. Transport Emissions in Mexico City 
Air pollution is a serious problem further aggravated by congestion, and low average 
speeds of traffic.  About three-quarters of the road network in the DF has an average 
traffic speed lower than 20 km/hr, with traffic demand exceeding road capacity. In such 
congested conditions, all vehicles produce significantly higher emissions due to 
frequently starting, stopping and idling in traffic. In addition, the age of the vehicle fleet 
is an important factor leading to high emissions. Inspection and maintenance records of 
vehicles in the DF show that 15% of the taxis and colectivos were nine years old or older 
in 1999. Of the 1.15 million private cars inspected, a sizeable 43% were models older 
than 1991, when no catalytic converters were required in vehicles24.  
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24 Molina and Molina (2002) 
Private cars and taxis produce the most pollutants per passenger trip in the MCMA. They 
are responsible for most of the carbon monoxide emissions, and the highest proportions 
of nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons. Private cars produce over half the total pollutants in 
the metropolitan area as shown in the table below. 
TABLE 2-2 Mobile Sources Emissions Inventory 1997 (tons/year) 
Source Particulates SO2 CO  NOx HC  Total  % 
Private Cars 87 2,474 1,327,858 40,151 97,510 1,468,080 53.4%
Private Transit Operators 29 396 177,252 3,683 19,018 200,378 7.3%
Taxi Cabs 17 481 258,156 7,806 18,957 285,417 10.4%
State-owned buses 59 13 1,458 1,232 472 3,234 0.1%
Intercity and suburban buses 95 21 2,340 1,978 757 5,191 0.2%
Privately operated buses 283 62 6,978 5,896 2,258 15,477 0.6%
Light weight trucks 107 1,459 653,318 13,575 70,096 738,555 26.9%
Heavy weight trucks 535 246 13,774 11,639 4,457 30,651 1.1%
TOTAL 1,212 5,152 2,441,134 85,960 213,525 2,746,983 100.0%
% Private Cars 7.2% 48.0% 54.4% 46.7% 45.7%  
Source: Villegas-Lopez (2000) 
 
The environmental and transportation agencies in the MCMA have made considerable 
efforts towards improving air quality in the city. The Hoy No Circula (No Driving Day) 
program was an important step in this direction. It was instituted to ban cars older than 
1993 from circulation on at least two days of the week and cars with catalytic converters 
but older than 1999 on one day of the week. This program has had mixed results, but the 
metropolitan environmental authority is planning to modify it to make it more stringent 
with stricter enforcement. 
 
The latest strategy for improving air quality (PROAIRE – 2002-2010) in the MCMA 
includes many measures related to transportation that are required to be implemented 
before 2010. These include introducing low-emission buses, substituting old taxis and 
colectivos, expanding the metro, light rail and trolley network, and constructing more 
roads to ease congestion. However, the implementation of these measures depends upon 
the respective institutions in the EM and the DF. 
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2.6. Institutional Structure 
The institutional structure in Mexico City is complex due to the presence of different 
overlapping levels of government.  These consist of the Federal government, the 
governments of the Federal District (DF) and the State of Mexico (EM), and the 
Metropolitan government, for each area of intervention – transportation, land use, and the 
environment.  Local governments such as those of the municipalities in the EM and 
delegaciones in the DF, international funding organizations, the private sector, especially 
infrastructure firms, private banks, real estate companies, universities, NGOs, labor 
unions, and private transit operators, are other actors playing active roles in the land use 
and transportation system that Mexico City represents. 
 
Of the metropolitan organizations, while the metropolitan environmental commission 
(CAM) has considerable powers, the metropolitan transportation commission 
(COMETRAVI) usually has limited decision-making power as it suffers from conflicts 
between the EM and the DF. It is therefore, not effective in implementing policies, even 
though it conducts detailed studies on the MCMA’s transportation system that inform 
policy-making. The transportation agencies of the DF (SETRAVI) and the EM (SCT) 
invest in their own jurisdictions with little coordination. For example, while the 
SETRAVI acknowledges that the metro network needs to expand into the EM on the 
north and northeast, it is not able to proceed due to the limited funding contribution of the 
EM. The federal transportation agency, the Secretariat of Communications and Transport, 
is actively involved in infrastructure construction, and is responsible for traffic 
management and toll collections in the MCMA. In considering the application of 
congestion pricing in the city, it is necessary to study the roles of the various institutions 
and their responsibilities in more depth. Since the institutions are tied to political 
jurisdictions, there is bound to be a conflict of interests that must be dealt with.  
2.7. Current Projects and Policies on the Urban Transport Agenda 
In recent years, efforts to improve transportation in the MCMA have culminated in the 
approval of several projects at the urban and metropolitan level. It is these projects which, 
when completed, will dictate the future of travel demand in the region, and of land use 
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developments. Thus, it is important to track the development of these projects not only to 
assess travel demand but also to see where a demand restraint measure like congestion 
pricing might fit into the current agenda. 
 
Both the DF and EM governments, as well as the federal government have planned many 
large scale transportation projects. These range from construction of a third and fourth 
ring road, to building elevated toll roads, metro expansions, dedicated bus corridors, 
improving and installing traffic signals and parking meters, and so on. According to the 
Mayor’s ‘high priority’ actions for 2004, investments of over 47 billion pesos will be 
made in the city’s transportation system, of which 6.4 billion pesos will be invested in the 
maintenance of the Metro, 3 billion to roadway and bridge projects, 885 million to the 
RTP bus system, and 582 million to the environment25. Extensions to the metro have been 
postponed since the year 2000 due to limited availability of funds for capital investments. 
 
While the Mexican transportation authorities are investing in significant public transport 
improvements towards a general strategy of encouraging high capacity modes that can 
substitute travel by private modes, they are also actively investing in more roads and 
bridges to relieve congestion in the short term. Unless the public transport modes are 
made more attractive and private transport is made to bear its fair costs, it is unlikely that 
the motorization rate will stabilize. Some transportation projects, begun in the period 
2003-2004 are described below, with their possible repercussions for congestion.   
2.7.1. Public transport 
 
In terms of public transport improvements, the DF proposes to extend three existing 
Metro lines, 4, 5 and 11, into the EM, and construct three new lines by 2020. Two Bus 
Rapid Transit lines are planned on the high demand corridors of Eje 8 Sur in the Estado 
de Mexico and Insurgentes Avenue in the DF. These are being funded by the World Bank 
and the United Nations Global Environment Facility and will be operated by private 
companies.  Currently detailed modeling studies for these corridors are underway. To 
reduce truck traffic congestion in the busy DF areas, freight distribution centers or 
                                                 
25 Reforma, Tuesday, January 6, 2004 
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‘logistics platforms’ are proposed on the outskirts of the DF26, along with regulations to 
control freight traffic. 
 
Bus Rapid Transit 
The first phase of Bus Rapid Transit system in the city, called “Metrobus”, includes 
corridors along Insurgentes and Popocatépetl (Eje 8 Sur) avenues, and will begin 
operations in 2005.  A total length of 200 km of bus corridors has been proposed.  These 
metropolitan corridors will have segregated lanes in the center of the avenues as in 
Bogota, with pre-paid passenger boarding on high-platform buses with left-side doors. 
Bus stops will be located at intervals of 400 meters, and the buses will circulate at 20 
km/hour27.  The DF government expects a ridership of 225,000-232,000 passengers a day 
on the Insurgentes corridor. The buses are meant to replace the colectivos on these 
corridors. 
 
While the central lanes will be exclusively for the new buses, leading to one less lane for 
the other vehicular traffic, drivers will also gain the right lane that is used by colectivos at 
present, once they are replaced by the buses. The BRT corridors will be linked with the 
Metro network, and the colectivo routes that cross Insurgentes will serve as feeder routes. 
The DF government hopes to finish six routes by 2006, when the current mayor - Lopez 
Obrador’s term ends28.  This is another positive development with respect to creating 
better public transport alternatives in the city. 
 
Metro 
Efforts are underway to improve the accessibility of trip destinations in the DF for 
residents in the Estado de Mexico. With the completion of the new Metro Line B in the 
year 2000, the EM municipalities to the northeast of the DF have improved access to the 
central areas of the city, with the line ending just north of the central business district at 
Buenavista station. The high ridership of about 320,000 passengers per day on this line is 
evidence of significant suburban demand.  
                                                 
26 Molina and Molina (2002) 
27 El Independiente, p. 18 - Saturday, September 6, 2003 
28 Reforma. p. 1B - Sunday, September 21, 2003 
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Government documents for transportation plans up to the year 2010 contain various 
figures of investments in the metro. The chief priority is to invest in maintenance of the 
metro and metro stations. Secretariat of Transport and Communications has approved 
funding to acquire 45 new trains and equipment. The stations are being rehabilitated, for 
example, the Pantitlan Station in the DF, which is the largest in Mexico City and sees 
heavy passenger volumes each day. 
 
In addition, the DF authorities are considering the application of smart cards to 
modernize fare collection on the metro network. This will be especially important to 
integrate fares between the public transport modes within the DF.  This technology would 
be used in the Metro, city buses, light rail and trolleybuses, as well as the BRT lines 
planned for Insurgentes and Eje 8 Sur, and will help improve the image of public 
transport in the city.   
 
Colectivos 
The fares on colectivos and concessioned buses have increased by 25%, and taxi fares are 
proposed to be 20% higher in 2004. Fares on government operated public transport, 
including the Metro, light rail, trolleys and buses have not been increased29. The DF 
government is also taking aggressive action to substitute older buses, taxis and colectivos 
with new vehicle fleets that will have lower emissions. Not only are these changes 
expected to facilitate improvements in service and ridership, but the higher fares will 
increase the incomes of colectivo operators.  The higher fares could help offset the 
increased costs of a congestion charge for colectivo operators, if congestion pricing is 
considered at a later stage. If discounts are given to the colectivos, these need to be 
considered carefully so as not to undermine the purpose of the congestion charge. 
 
The perception of crimes and insecurity on public transport is high in Mexico City, thus 
other measures are being taken to increase the attractiveness of public transport, such as 
the installation of centrally controlled security cameras in metro stations with high 
                                                 
29 Reforma. Friday, January 2, 2004 
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passenger volumes such as Pantitlan station. Panic buttons will be installed in colectivo 
vehicles to improve passenger security and prevent assaults. 
 
Tren Suburbano 
The DF authorities have also begun the bidding process for the construction of a new 
suburban train (Tren Suburbano) that would run from Buenavista train station in the DF 
to the State of Mexico. The 25-km stretch would require an investment of US $600 
million, distributed between the EM, the federal government, and private funds, with the 
DF only providing the necessary permits.  The initial demand for the suburban train is 
projected at 320,000 daily passengers, with a trip time of 30 minutes, with service 
commencing in 200530.  The Metro Line B is evidence that these investments in 
improving public transport linkages between the DF and the EM can potentially lead to a 
substitution of colectivo trips, thereby reducing the need for lower income passengers to 
depend on this mode. 
2.7.2. Private transport 
 
Parking Meters 
Parking meters will be installed in the three central delegaciones of the DF- Benito 
Juarez, Cuauhtemoc and Miguel Hidalgo. The fare for parking meters in the DF will be 2 
pesos per 15 minutes (US $0.80 for an hour). The delegacion Cuauhtemoc where the 
Centro Historico is located, is expected to collect 90 million pesos (US $ 9 million) in 
revenue annually, 80% of which would be used by the delegación to finance its various 
programs31. This is an important step to initiate the ‘culture of paying’ for road space in 
congested areas. The second phase of the remodeling of the Centro Historico has also 
begun, which will include repair of streets and drainage systems, renovating the facades 
of historic buildings, improving the lighting, and removing street vendors32. The DF 
government has been trying to evict street vendors from the Centro Historico for many 
years without success. The street vendors are low-income people who usually carry their 
merchandise in low-cost polluting private vehicles; thus they represent a group that 
                                                 
30 Reforma, October 15, 2003 
31 Reforma. Wednesday, January 14, 2004 
32 Reforma. Friday, January 16, 2004 
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stands to be disadvantaged by any possibility of congestion pricing. However, it can be 
argued that the Hoy No Circula program presents a far greater disadvantage in this regard 
by prohibiting the vendors’ livelihoods for one or two days in a week.  
 
Construction of roads and highways 
The current mayor of Mexico City favors significant investments in roads, bridges and 
highways. Ongoing projects include a system of elevated roads through the center of the 
city forming a 35-km ‘Metropolitan Corridor’ (Corredor Vial Metropolitano) linking the 
north and south of the city from Ciudad Azteca in the State of Mexico, to Xochimilco in 
the south of the DF. It will be built by 2005, and will run parallel to the Insurgentes 
Avenue. It is envisaged as an alternative to the Insurgentes, one of the most congested 
roads in the DF with an average speed of 18 km per hour during peak hours33.  
 
Other efforts to divert traffic away from the city center include the construction of a 148-
km Outer Ring Road in the State of Mexico, linking the highways of Mexico City to 
those of the surrounding crown cities of Queretaro, Pachuca and Puebla. This privately 
operated regional highway will serve as the fourth ring road and will allow 600,000 to 
800,000 vehicles per day to bypass the DF along the north-east quadrant of the MCMA34. 
A third ring road has already been partially constructed, with its northern portion 
operating as a toll road, about 25 km from the city center. These ring roads will be 
concentric with the existing Circuito Interior (Inner Ring Road) and the Periferico 
beltway around the DF, and are being constructed primarily to prevent inter-city traffic 
from passing through congested parts of the MCMA.  
 
Road connections between the DF and the EM, as well as within the EM, will be 
improved along with installation of traffic signals to manage the disorderly traffic in the 
EM.  There is also a proposal to build elevated toll expressways on the most congested 
facilities in the DF. Apart from these projects, the controversial Segundos Pisos project to 
build a second level over the Periferico and Viaducto roads is already under construction. 
                                                 
33 Reforma.  Sunday, January 11, 2004 
34 Reforma. Tuesday, January 13, 2004 
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The strong focus on building more ring roads and metropolitan highways in Mexico City 
is evident from the recent investment budget for transportation activities shown in Table 
2-3. Most of these projects are currently being implemented, and have been described 
above. With 62% of the overall budget devoted to elevated, highways, roads and 
bypasses, it is likely that the steep growth in car use will continue in the MCMA. While it 
may be argued that some of these roads are essential to improve the links between the DF 
and the EM, those being constructed as a short-term approach to solve the city’s 
congestion problem will end up being congested themselves after some years. 
 
TABLE 2-3 Transportation Investment Budget for 2002 
Transport Improvements 
Investment         
(million pesos) Percentage 
Elevated highways 1,500 39% 
Other highways and bypasses 889 23% 
Metro 1,054 27% 
New buses 155 4% 
New trolleys 103 3% 
New taxis 100 3% 
New minibuses 80 2% 
TOTAL 3,881 100% 
Source: SETRAVI - Comprehensive Traffic and Transportation Plan (2001-2006) 
 
In his popular book ‘Stuck in Traffic’, Downs has described the triple convergence 
principle35 of traveler behavior that occurs when new highways are constructed. It 
comprises the effect of (i) drivers who used alternative routes earlier, switching to the 
new highway (spatial convergence), (ii) drivers who earlier traveled just outside the peak 
hours to avoid peak period congestion, starting to travel in the peak hours on the new 
highway (time convergence), and (iii) mode shift of some people from public 
transportation to cars due to higher speeds possible on the new highway (mode 
convergence). Triple convergence thus causes an increasing number of drivers to use the 
new highways, up to the point that they become congested to the same level that the 
alternate routes were. 
 
                                                 
35 Downs and Brookings Institution. (1992) 
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The one remedy that avoids the effects of triple convergence is if some form of road 
pricing is implemented. In that case, congestion charges or peak period road tolls would 
lead to a reverse effect, that of triple divergence. Commuters formerly using certain 
facilities would change their route, time of travel, or mode, if a congestion toll were 
introduced. Zone-based congestion pricing added to high parking charges will together 
represent a cost that is higher than the value of time for many commuters, thus deterring 
them from driving into the congestion zone. A distance-based charge on driving is 
inequitable for many people in Mexico City, because lower income households live far 
from the city center. 
 
Table 2-4 summarizes the various transportation policies currently proposed in the 
MCMA. We see that while most of the policies on the agenda are complementary with 
congestion pricing, the one that is not, that of adding more capacity is also the one that 
demands the largest magnitude of public investment (see Figure 3-22). 
TABLE 2-4 Summary of Current Transportation Policies Proposed in the MCMA 
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1 Suburban train line between DF and EM Substitution of colectivo trips, improved access +
2 us Rapid Transit corridors New transport alternative, substitution of colectivo trips +
3 etro station rehabilitation and train maintenance Increased reliability, improved image of public transport +
4 Extensions of the Metro into the EM Substitution of colectivo trips and improved access +
5 art cards to integrate BRT and metro fares More efficient transfers, lower costs, higher ridership +
6 re increases on colectivos  and private buses Reduced ridership, increased income for operators +
7 Renewal of bus, taxi and colectivo  fleets Improved level of service, reduction in emissions +
8 curity features in Metro stations and colectivos Improved ridership due to higher levelof security +
9 nstallation of Parking Meters Reduction in on street parking, increased revenues +
10 ads, third ring road, Segundo Pisos Increased speed, increased VKT, reduced congestion -
Current Policies on the Agenda Potential Medium-Term Impacts Complementarity 
with Congestion 
Pricing
Assuming that calculations to set the congestion charge are such that it accurately 
represents the marginal social costs drivers impose on society, the question for travelers 
would be whether they value their time more than the congestion charge or less. If their 
time value were higher, then they would pay the charge, and if not then they would 
choose to drive on congested roads.  For those who value their time more, and also have 
relatively lower incomes, public transport would have to be efficient enough to not 
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restrict their mobility. A congestion charge would facilitate this by resulting in improved 
travel speed and reliability of road-based public transport. It is essential to convey to 
people that the congestion charge they would pay is the social cost of travel delays and 
congestion that each driver inflicts. Even if people are amenable to waiting in traffic, they 
impose costs on others that they must pay for.  
 
A detailed explanation of congestion pricing, the economic and political issues 
surrounding its implementation, and the reasons it is a controversial policy, are discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. CONGESTION PRICING – ECONOMIC, 
POLITICAL, AND EQUITY ISSUES 
 
3.1.  Growing Motorization in the Developing World 
Automobile ownership is increasing worldwide, and most of the growth in the last two 
decades is occurring in the developing countries. This is no surprise because while 
average per capita incomes are far lower in these countries, the rate of growth in incomes 
is very high. With rising personal income, automobile ownership grows slowly in the 
beginning, and then reaches an income threshold beyond which it grows rapidly. Further 
rise in income again relates with slower growth in ownership because people at those 
income levels already own as many cars as they desired. Finally, a level of saturation is 
reached when almost all of the highest income population owns (and uses) automobiles. 
The classic S-curve representing this relationship is shown in Figure 3-1.  
 
FIGURE 3-1 Growth in Motorization with Income 
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Source: Gakenheimer (2003)36 
If the relationship shown above were depicted by country, then many developing 
countries would be located in the steepest portion of the graph. Rapid economic growth 
and uncontrolled motorization in these countries in recent years has exacerbated 
conditions of congestion and air pollution. Today, many of the fastest growing urban 
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36 Presentation titled ‘Rapid Motorization in Cities of the Developing World’, WBCSD (2003) 
areas in the developing world face a situation where traffic flows are fast approaching 
existing capacity. This phenomenon of ‘hitting the wall’37, as it were, is shown in Figure 
3-2, and is prevalent on a majority of links in the central districts of Mexico City. 
 
FIGURE 3-2   Congested Traffic Conditions: ‘Hitting the Wall’ 
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Source: Plane, D. (1995) 
 
3.2. Congestion Pricing: Economic Arguments 
The benefits of congestion pricing are that it helps to reduce travel delays in congested 
areas, encourages use of public transport in these areas, artificially increases capacity 
leading to higher average speeds and higher business efficiency in moving people and 
goods, creates a better and safer environment for pedestrians and cyclists, helps reduce 
greenhouse gases and polluting emissions, and finally, generates revenue that can be 
applied to a variety of purposes. 
 
Pricing aims at improving utilization of present capacity, rather than investing in 
construction of more roads.  The latter is currently the case in Mexico City, with 
government investment directed toward road building activities, such as construction of 
second levels (Segundos Pisos) on two major urban highways as a congestion relief 
measure.  It also aims at increasing the efficiency of surface public transport such as 
buses, by reducing travel delays for passengers. It raises revenues for the public sector, 
which can help reduce fiscal deficit, and be used toward improvements in transport 
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37 Plane, D. Urban Transportation Policy Alternatives. Essay in Hanson. Ed.  (1995). p. 441. 
infrastructure, institutional capacity, or other welfare measures.  The hypothecation of 
revenues is particularly important when considering congestion pricing, as it directly 
affects public acceptability of the policy. 
 
In technical terms, congestion pricing is a means to distribute travel demand more evenly 
across road capacity and times of day, by charging people a fee for using urban roads.  It 
is thus, a means to internalize the external costs of urban transportation, manifested 
mostly in traffic congestion, travel delays, and vehicular emissions.  It involves rationing 
limited road space between public and private transport modes, to improve the efficiency 
of publicly provided infrastructure.  In economic terms, the policy requires that people 
pay a charge to reflect the true costs of private vehicle use in congested urban areas.  
These ‘true costs’ represent the marginal social costs of time delays imposed on other 
road users, the externality costs of congestion, associated air pollution, road accidents, 
and continuing road operations and maintenance costs. 
FIGURE 3-3  The Economics of Congestion Pricing 
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Source: Adapted from Salvucci38 
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38 Lecture notes for class 1.253. Transportation Policy and Environmental Limits. MIT. Spring 2004. 
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Figure 3-3 shows the downward sloping demand curve for a typical urban road. The 
demand curve aggregates the marginal benefit that each traveler gains from using the 
road. Considering a fixed level of service, as traffic volume on the road increases, and 
more of the road’s capacity is used up, the marginal benefit reduces.  
 
There are two distinct cost curves, one that is the marginal social cost curve, representing 
the costs to society of an extra vehicle on the road, and the other is the cost perceived by 
each individual, or the average cost curve. The cost considered here is the sum of all 
variable costs, time costs, and costs related with inconvenience caused to drivers on 
congested road conditions. As long as traffic on the road remains free flowing, the cost of 
an extra vehicle being added remains constant, represented by GH in the figure. 
 
The value Q3 represents traffic volume on the road when there is no congestion. As more 
vehicles are added to the road, the cost perceived by individual travelers begins to rise 
and is higher than the costs under free flowing conditions. This average cost curve turns 
back at very high traffic flows, when some travelers decide not to drive due to 
congestion, delays, and such traffic externalities.  The maximum capacity of the road is 
represented by QMAX. At any level of congestion, the individually perceived cost is 
always lower than the marginal social cost, which increases more rapidly with increasing 
volume. Figure 2-3 shows that for free-flowing traffic between points G and H, the 
marginal social cost is the same as the average cost. 
 
Socially optimum traffic flow on a road is achieved when the marginal social cost equals 
the marginal benefit to each traveler, at point D. Thus, ideally, the traffic volume should 
be limited to Q2. However, since travelers perceive only the lower individual costs, they 
continue to use the road even as congestion increases. More vehicles keep adding on till 
the equilibrium point E, where individual costs equal marginal benefit. Volume on the 
road then increases to the sub-optimal level, Q1. 
 
A congestion charge can help resolve the problem of travelers perceiving road usage 
costs to be lower than they actually are. If users were charged a toll equal to the distance 
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DF as congestion costs, then they would perceive and pay a higher cost, at point D. The 
road would thus, only be used up to a volume Q2 as some people would be priced out. 
The reduction in trips resulting from the toll would equal (Q1 - Q2).  These people would 
end up worse off than before the toll, yet overall social benefit would be maximized. 
 
The strong economic argument for congestion pricing is that a significant portion of the 
cost of congestion is captured as toll revenues. The revenues would equal the area of 
rectangle ABDF. In economic terms, the lost consumer surplus (or mobility of people 
deciding to not drive on the road) is much less than the revenues generated from the 
congestion charge in the case shown. The revenues can be used in investments to 
compensate the people made worse off, for example, in enhancing public transportation. 
3.3. Politics Associated with Congestion Pricing 
William Vickrey, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1996 for his ideas on 
congestion pricing in transportation, has said, “Even where change is obviously called 
for, it tends to come in homeopathic doses and to follow lines of proportional adjustment 
along traditional patterns rather than break into innovative territory.”39 It is most likely 
politics that are responsible for this. 
 
In his essay titled ‘The Political Context of Transportation Policy’, Wachs has said that 
congestion pricing is a good idea and has already been proven to work.  He says that the 
concept is readily accepted in other contexts, such as telephone companies charging 
differentially for calls based on the time and day of the week, airline fares that are priced 
according to he timing and location of trips, ‘early bird specials’ in stores and restaurants, 
and matinee discounts in movie theaters.  Planners and transportation economists agree 
that congestion pricing would have many benefits. Still, the political realities of 
implementation are so difficult that the policy is rarely adopted40.  
 
                                                 
39 Vickrey (1992) 
40 Wachs, M.  The Political Context of Transportation Policy. Essay in Hanson. Ed. (1995). pp. 282-285. 
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Congestion pricing forces governments to change the way they think about infrastructure 
costs by considering the social costs not previously accounted for, and making road users 
pay for these costs.  This usually seems more difficult to achieve than a policy like 
raising the fuel tax by a few cents. A small increase in the fuel tax would be a marginal 
change, and the people supporting the policy would be far more in number than those 
who would be affected enough to oppose it. People are used to paying for the fuel they 
use.  Whereas, it would be far more difficult to raise consensus for congestion pricing, in 
order that it may successfully pass through the various levels of decision-making.  One of 
the reasons for this is the lack of an obvious constituency of supporters for the policy, 
who would lobby for it at various levels of government.  
 
There is not enough dedicated support for the policy in groups other than scholars of 
transportation, economics, geography and planning, who form a weak political force.  
Downtown businesses might gain from reduced congestion but would be apprehensive in 
their support because they might also lose business to other commercial areas.  Freight 
and trucking industries usually see a congestion charge only as an additional cost, in spite 
of the fact that they might improve their operational efficiency due to reduced 
congestion41. Transit agencies could benefit from congestion pricing as it would result in 
increased ridership, but the constituency of transit riders is not powerful enough, as 
compared to automobile owners or say, colectivo owners in Mexico City.  Colectivo and 
taxi drivers would oppose the increase in operating costs and their riders would fear the 
additional cost being reflected in increased fares.  The constituency of colectivo riders 
and operators is especially powerful in case of Mexico City because colectivos carry over 
half the mode share of all trips.  
 
Another reason why support for congestion pricing is low is that paying for congestion 
relief is not considered a tangible objective for most people.  Automobile owners argue 
that they have already paid for road infrastructure through various taxes.  In addition, 
they pay for using the roads through fuel taxes that are roughly proportional to the 
amount people drive.  Thus, a congestion charge is only regarded as paying twice for the 
                                                 
41 Hanson (1995). p.283. 
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same roads.  Economists know that peak period pricing will cause travel patterns to shift 
and is a viable policy option, as seen in other industries.  However, it is difficult to 
communicate the idea to laypersons or political leaders because demand for peak period 
travel is assumed to be inelastic, given the largely homogeneous and rigid work schedules 
of most people.  Since people have to travel at peak hours, it is believed that congestion 
pricing will have little effect.  It will merely raise more money from beleaguered 
motorists who will still be driving under congested conditions42.  
 
The few examples of implemented schemes around the world, such as in Singapore and 
London show that prices can be set at an appropriate level to reduce congestion, but how 
the price is set is critical.  Even in the event that a pricing policy is implemented, if the 
stipulated charge is too high for people to use the roads, then it would be termed a failure 
in the political arena, the same consequence if the price is fixed too low to reduce 
congestion.  Since these outcomes cannot accurately be predicted beforehand, the 
potential risks drive politicians away from considering the policy.  
 
The political dilemma also results from the fact that public views and professional views 
towards congestion pricing are very different, especially in cities where high quality 
public transport options are limited. In cities where the policy has been implemented with 
some success, the varying views converged in the manner shown in Figure 3-4. This has 
been possible only with good and extensive public communication by the professionals 
and the implementing agency.  
 
The perspective that congestion revenues can be used for public benefit is one that needs 
to be effectively communicated to the people. While the revenues generated by 
congestion charging can have any use, in the few cases where the scheme has been 
implemented, the authorities have pledged to devote the funds exclusively to 
transportation infrastructure. Public opinion is less hostile to a new charge when the 
revenue is used to invest in the activities that are taxed43. Due to the reinvestment of 
                                                 
42 Hanson (1995). p.283. 
43 Downs and Brookings Institution. (1992). p. 53. 
 45
revenues in transportation, some people describe congestion pricing not as the commonly 
understood ‘demand restraint’ measure, but rather as a ‘supply restructuring’ measure44. 
The term ‘demand restraint’ has negative connotations of restricting mobility, and when 
the policy is communicated as such, it is likely to have a detrimental effect on public 
opinion and political will. Whereas, restructuring supply in order that high-density public 
transport modes that are used by more people, receive a mobility advantage over low-
density private modes, is a more positive way of communicating the idea to people. 
FIGURE 3-4  Convergence of Public and Professional (Government) Views 
Required for Successful Implementation of a Road Pricing Scheme 
 
Source:Adapted from conference presentation by Cain, A. and A. Macaulay45 
                                                 
44 Attributed to Fred Salvucci, Senior Lecturer at MIT 
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In Mexico City, the transport sector is heavily subsidized.  The Metro has a very low fare 
of $0.20 per trip and is subsidized for about 37% of its operations; however, automobile 
use is subsidized far more.  Subsidies to public transport are subject to public 
accountability, while the subsidies and externality costs of automobile use are hidden 
from such accountability because their amount and distribution are simply not quantified.  
Some of the ways in which automobile use in a city is subsidized include the 
uncompensated delays on police and emergency vehicles, the costs of pollution and 
congestion, and the loss of property taxes on land cleared for highways46. 
 
Promotion of the automobile and concerns for network efficiency have led to 
infrastructure investments in Mexico City that disregard the most economically 
disadvantaged classes, and cater to the car-owning population.  The market has thus 
responded in a way that people prefer point-to-point colectivo rides to metro or bus 
transport. The colectivo services, provided by private operators, cause congestion in the 
central city areas, and contribute to the suburbanization of employment.  The 
development of low-density suburban employment centers, coupled with investment in 
road capacity to improve access to them, has increased demand for the private automobile 
further.  The higher congestion caused by private automobiles and colectivos has in turn 
lowered the level of service for road-based public transport, reducing the demand for it.   
 
Thus, it is very important to promote the ‘right’ mode.  The colectivos have the largest 
mode share in Mexico City today, and it is imperative that their service routes be 
reorganized to primarily act as feeders to high-density public transport, such as the metro 
and new bus corridors.  Doing this, combined with implementing a congestion charge for 
automobiles for accessing the central city areas, the revenues of which would be used to 
further improve bus and metro service, provides a package of measures that could 
balance out the mode share. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 Conference presentation at ‘Road Pricing: The Way Forward’ Conference - Workshop 3B on Stakeholder   
Consultation and User Acceptance, London, 24-25 Feb, 2004 
46 Hodge, D.  My Fair Share: Equity Issues in Urban Transportation. Essay in Hanson. Ed. (1995). p. 364. 
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3.4. Different Methods of Pricing Congestion 
Pricing is used to influence travel behavior by increasing the perceived cost of 
automobile travel from the user’s standpoint. It may involve the following methods: 
(i) direct user charges, in the form of tolls for access to facilities or areas, charges 
based on trip length, and those based on trip timing (peak or off-peak hours),  
(ii) indirect user charges, such as vehicle purchase and registration fees, licensing 
fees, fuel taxes, and surcharges on parking,  
(iii) tax exemptions designed to eliminate inequities, or incentives provided to 
encourage specific travel modes47. 
Direct user charges increase the cost per trip or the cost per kilometer, causing reduction 
in the number of trips as well as trip lengths. They may induce increased use of public 
transit by erstwhile automobile users, with a net reduction in vehicle-kilometers traveled 
by private low-density vehicles. Indirect charges such as fuel taxes could have similar 
effects, and in addition, affect the types of automobiles people purchase in terms of fuel 
efficiency. Whether direct or indirect, the increased cost of using an automobile will 
influence the location decisions of households and firms, thus affecting land use patterns 
in the longer term. Reduction in vehicle-kilometers driven is also likely to reduce 
automobile emissions at a more regional level in the longer term. 
 
The mechanisms for instituting direct charges for the purpose of reducing congestion fall 
in the category of congestion pricing, or what is also called value pricing. Around the 
world, the policy has been applied to usage of private automobiles in the following 
distinct ways, each with its own merits and demerits. These applications of congestion 
pricing vary in their technological sophistication, costs, scale, and consequences, and 
fulfill different objectives. 
1) Cordon pricing, and area-based pricing: Schemes of this type involve pricing a 
designated area that suffers from congestion, with travelers paying for driving their 
automobiles into the area.  It is usually the central business district of a city that 
becomes part of a ‘congestion zone’ due to the high number of trips made there. 
Travelers pay for crossing a cordon while entering or exiting the zone, or for driving 
                                                 
47 Soberman and Miller (1999) 
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within the zone. This form of congestion pricing first began in Singapore as an Area 
Licensing Scheme, and was recently implemented in London. The charge can be 
collected from drivers each time they enter or exit the zone. It is collected as a daily 
fee that does not restrict the number of trips made to the congestion zone during 
stipulated hours, as in London. 
2) Facility pricing, or time-based pricing of individual streets or highway lanes: This 
involves electronic collection of charges from travelers on a congested street or 
highway during peak hours. People in vehicles having high occupancy, in low-
emissions vehicles, transit vehicles, or other target categories are discounted or waived 
of the charge. Such schemes have mostly been implemented on freeways in the United 
States and Canada. 
3) Distance-based pricing: This is a sophisticated form of pricing based on the distance 
driven on particular facilities, in certain areas, or during certain hours on the 
transportation network. There are few examples since the technology is still being 
developed. Germany has instituted distance-based charging for heavy goods vehicles, 
with other European cities also considering the approach. 
4) Electronic Road Pricing (ERP): This is a form of pricing where the daily operations 
are not manual, but are managed through intelligent transportation systems (ITS) with 
automated charge collection. ERP is considered a more accurate form of pricing 
because the charges paid by travelers can be programmed to vary with traffic 
conditions, location, and time of day. There is a wide spectrum of technological 
choices that have been used to implement ERP, though most are still new and 
relatively expensive. All examples of this form of road pricing have been executed in 
cities of the developed world, such as Toronto, San Diego, Melbourne, Trondheim,  
(Norway), and Singapore. One reason for this is the high technology cost and another, 
possibly more significant reason, is the presence of accurate vehicle registration 
databases in these cities. The absence of a single current vehicle database in many 
developing cities makes the option of ERP almost impossible. Indeed, the operation of 
any congestion pricing scheme, whether electronic or not, will necessarily depend on 
reliable registration records for all categories of vehicles. 
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In some cases indirect user charges are preferred over direct charges as a means of 
managing travel demand. These charges, such as fuel taxes, vehicle registration fees, and 
parking charges, are often suggested to discourage use of the automobile because they 
increase the total cost of driving, and also because they are considered easier to 
implement.  However, they are not considered in the realm of congestion pricing because 
they are not based on location or time of travel. These charges do not lead to targeted 
improvement in congested areas, and because they are more broad-based, only small 
increments are politically feasible. The small changes typically do not result in very 
noticeable changes in travel habits. Parking surcharges applied in congested central 
business areas can be considered closest to congestion pricing. This is especially the case 
in places like Mexico City where on street parking in such areas is either heavily 
employer-subsidized or free. 
 
Parking charges have been introduced in cities around the world as a first step towards 
more sophisticated urban road pricing schemes. Not only are they relatively easier to 
implement but they also help in creating awareness and acceptance among users 
regarding the cost of on street parking and driving in central city areas. Parking charges 
can be used as a proxy for congestion pricing to start with, by being differentiated 
according to different criteria. Parking charges can be (i) higher in central business 
districts and zones of high traffic, (ii) higher during peak hours to discourage long-term 
parking, (iii) higher on weekdays, to distinguish commuter parking from weekday 
traveler parking, and (iv) higher for long-term parking, to provide incentives that 
encourage short-term parking. The revenues can be used for local investment. For 
example, in Quito, Ecuador, where parking was previously unregulated, new parking 
charges imposed in the city center are used to fund the city’s Bus Rapid Transit System48. 
 
Economic instruments such as pricing can also be used as incentives to encourage certain 
travel modes, such as fare reductions on public transit. However, this necessitates that a 
robust and efficient public transit system be in place first. For example, in London, before 
the congestion pricing scheme was introduced, in addition to increasing the size of the 
                                                 
48 Breithaupt (2004) 
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bus fleet, the bus fares were artificially kept low to make transit use more attractive than 
driving a car. However, where mass transit is predominantly under private control, such 
as in case of the colectivos in Mexico City, this policy is very difficult to implement. 
3.5. Brief Overview of Congestion Pricing Schemes Around the World 
In this section, we extend the theoretical overview by describing some varied cases of 
congestion pricing implemented in cities around the world. We have paid particular 
attention to the schemes implemented in London and Singapore, since in both cases, the 
scale of the scheme is large enough, and the number of trips to the city center is high, as 
is the case in Mexico City. These schemes are both area-based and surrounded by a ring 
road, though very different in pricing structure and technology. 
3.5.1. London Congestion Charging Scheme49 
 
The London Congestion Charging Scheme is regarded as the world’s largest congestion 
charging operation. The objective of the London Congestion Charge was to encourage 
people to use public transport, bicycles or walk, instead of driving into Central London. It 
aimed to increase efficiency, speed and reliability of public and private transport journeys 
and to raise revenues to re-invest in transport improvements. The scheme in London also 
apparently helped reduce pollution in the central areas by encouraging use of clean fuel 
vehicles, as owners of such vehicles were exempt from the charge. However, may argue 
that policies to reduce air pollution and policies to reduce congestion must be kept 
separate because driving a clean fuel vehicle still adds to congestion. In addition, the area 
of the London scheme is considered too small to facilitate significant reduction in 
regional air pollution. 
 
The 21-sq. km. congestion charging zone is bounded by the London Inner Ring Road and 
about 200,000 vehicles drive into it per hour in the morning peak. It requires motorists to 
pay a daily charge of £5 for entering the charging zone between 7.00am and 6.30pm each 
weekday, excluding holidays.  
                                                 
49 Mahendra (2003) - Case Study on London Congestion Charging Scheme completed by the author for 
European Local Transport Information Service 
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Drivers pay to have their vehicle number plate registered on a database. About 230 
CCTV cameras installed along the boundary and inside the zone record images of 
vehicles entering, exiting and moving within it. An Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
(ANPR) system matches vehicles with the database of registrations to charge drivers who 
have not paid. Payment can be made weekly, monthly or annually through various modes 
and outlets. Motorcycles, taxis, emergency and alternative fuel vehicles are exempted and 
the 136,000 residents of the charging zone receive a 90% discount. Non-payment leads to 
different levels of penalties, followed by vehicle clamping or removal if drivers continue 
to default. 
 
Preceding implementation, TfL added over 300 buses representing 20% more passenger 
spaces and improved services to accommodate new riders, since 85% of people enter 
central London using public transport. The revenues raised must by law, be spent on 
transport improvements in London for the next 10 years. However, initial public aversion 
to the scheme and protests by freight transport operators were obstacles, along with 
insufficient enforcement affecting the scheme's credibility. TfL expected the scheme to 
cut traffic levels by 10-15%, but the traffic reduction has been much larger than expected, 
at about 30%, leading to unexpectedly lower revenues. In addition, there have been 
complaints about loss of retail business in the city center; however, some attribute this 
impact to a slower economy and lower number of tourists visiting London in 2003. 
 
Effective public information regarding importance of the charge and payment procedures, 
extensive stakeholder consultations, and public hearings have been key factors for the 
scheme's success. Other important factors were enhancement of bus services before 
implementation, and accompanying measures to improve traffic management. The 
scheme is just one measure of an overall strategy for improving transport in London. 
3.5.2. The Area Licensing Scheme and Electronic Road Pricing in Singapore 
Singapore introduced the world’s first urban road pricing scheme in 1975 as an Area 
Licensing Scheme. The Land Transport Authority (LTA) in Singapore has been actively 
trying to curb road congestion and to encourage use of public transport, given the limited 
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land space in this small island country. Two means have been used to do this – one, 
controls on car ownership through vehicle purchase quotas, and two, restraining vehicle 
usage through road user fees. High gas taxes further add to the costs of driving. At the 
same time, the LTA has developed a good public transport network comprising buses, 
light rail and mass rapid transit under a regulation that no residence should be more than 
400 m away from a public transit stop.  
 
Under the Area Licensing Scheme, the central business district (CBD) of Singapore was 
cordoned as a Restricted Zone covering 7.2-sq. km. and commuters had to purchase a 
paper-based Area License to drive their cars into the CBD during peak hours. There were 
exemptions for cars with more than four people, and enforcement was manual with police 
checks at the entry cordons. Results in 1992 showed that traffic entering the CBD in the 
morning peak was about half the level before the scheme was introduced 17 years earlier. 
Speeds had increased by 20% and accidents had fallen by 25%. Public transport’s share 
for working trips increased from 33% in 1974 to 67% in 1992 50. The fee was a flat 
charge of S$3 first applied only in peak hours, but then modified to include the whole day 
on week days. 
 
Some adverse impacts of this scheme were that it increased congestion on the 
expressways and feeder roads leading to the CBD. To deal with this, the government 
introduced manually operated congestion tolls on the three main expressways leading to 
the CBD. However, together these schemes, caused underutilization of roads in the CBD 
and immediate congestion just outside it. In addition, the manual operations made future 
modifications inflexible.   
 
Therefore, in 1998, the LTA implemented the Electronic Road Pricing Scheme (ERP) 
that covers the same cordon area as before, and comprises a 2.54 GHz dedicated short-
range radio communication system consisting of an In-vehicle Unit (IU), ERP gantries, 
and a control center51.  The 29 gantries installed at the cordon entry points automatically 
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deduct charges per crossing from pre-paid smart cards via an In-Vehicle Unit inside each 
automobile. Drivers can add credit to the smart cards, and charges are based on type of 
vehicle, location of crossing, day and time of day. Traffic speeds are reviewed quarterly, 
and the ERP rates are adjusted to maintain average expressway traffic speeds of 45-65 
km/hr and speeds of 20-30 km/hr on roads inside the CBD52. 
 
The result was that the volume of traffic entering into the CBD fell by 10-15% compared 
to the old Area Licensing Scheme. The substantial drop in demand resulted from the 
charge being per crossing rather than per day. This led to lower revenues than in the days 
of the earlier scheme because the increased number of payments did not offset the 
reduction in traffic volume. However, the revenues from the Singapore congestion 
pricing schemes have been used to develop the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) and light rail 
network in Singapore. This has increased the modal split of public transport from 46% in 
1976 to 70% in 1991 for all journey-to-work trips to the CBD53. For vehicles not 
possessing an IU, smart card, or sufficient funds, a digital image of the license plate is 
recorded to enforce violation penalties. 
 
In both cases, London and Singapore, the objective of the government was to reduce 
congestion, and the revenues are being used to improve public transport. As an economic 
instrument to charge car drivers the marginal social costs, the Singapore scheme is more 
technologically sophisticated as it charges based on congestion levels, location, and time 
of day, whereas London uses a simple camera-based technology to charge a daily flat fee.  
3.5.3. Congestion Pricing Initiatives in Asia, Europe, and North America 
 
Other schemes round the world have been implemented to serve different objectives, and 
with mixed results. For example, in Hong Kong, feasibility studies have been done to 
develop an ERP proposal similar to Singapore for reducing inner city congestion. 
Although successful technology trials have been completed in 1998, there is no 
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government support for the scheme. This is in spite of the fact that Hong Kong has a 
well-developed mass transit network as an alternative to driving.  
 
Public opposition is strong towards payment of charges, and because of privacy concerns 
about being constantly monitored on the road. In addition, on the government side, there 
is a fear of failure because in 1982, fiscal controls were adopted in Hong Kong to curb 
traffic, though these were not in the form of congestion pricing. The measures included 
increasing the annual fee for private cars by three times and doubling the fuel tax and the 
registration fee for new cars. The high costs resulted in about 20% reduction in vehicle 
ownership between 1981 and 1984, but congestion levels reduced only in the least 
congested areas, while remaining unabated in the most congested areas. The public 
perception was that the congestion problem had been exaggerated in 1982. The failure 
has led to stiff public and political opposition to any new schemes considered.  
 
Governments in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok have also rejected congestion pricing 
proposals for political reasons, although both cities routinely implement road tolls for 
infrastructure financing. On the other hand, cities in Norway, including Bergen, 
Trondheim and Oslo, have pursued cordon-based urban road pricing since 1986 as a 
means of financing roads, but are now planning to modify them to become congestion 
charging schemes. Since the objective of the ‘toll rings’, as they are called in Norway, 
has so far been only to raise revenues, the tolls have been low. They have only led to 
small traffic reductions, around 6-7% for Bergen, 3-4% in Oslo, and 10% in Trondheim, 
during the charged periods54. 
 
In Europe, the European Commission has been espousing road and congestion pricing for 
internalizing the external costs of transport for many years55, with the result that many 
cities are considering congestion pricing proposals in different forms. After the success of 
schemes in London and Durham in the United Kingdom, Edinburgh has proposed its own 
congestion charge with inner and outer cordons around the downtown area. Other cities 
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in Europe are proposing to introduce a kilometer-based electronic charging scheme as a 
more accurate form of congestion charging. In the Randstad region of the Netherlands 
(including Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht), a congestion charging 
scheme with multiple cordons was proposed in the late 1980s but was not implemented 
due to public opposition. Now, a kilometer-based charge is being considered for the 
region. In Germany, electronic distance-based charges have already been implemented on 
major motorways for heavy goods vehicles because freight traffic in the country is 
growing very rapidly since the formation of the European Union. 
 
In North America, much of the traffic congestion occurs on the freeways that are 
peripheral to downtown urban areas, linking several cities that are part of a larger 
metropolitan region. Thus, congestion pricing in many parts of the United States has been 
implemented either on an entire highway facility, or in the form of tolls on dedicated 
highway lanes to speed up traffic during peak hours. These lanes, usually called High 
Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes, allow vehicles with higher occupancy to travel free or at a 
discount, while those with lower or single occupancy pay a charge. Average traffic 
speeds on these lanes are usually higher because most commuters prefer to drive on the 
congested un-tolled lanes. Highway pricing projects with time-based charges are found in 
Lee County, Florida, Toronto, and New York, while HOT lanes are being operated in 
Houston, Minnesota, and San Diego, California.  
 
In Texas, the concept of HOT lanes is being taken a step further by using the toll 
revenues to implement high frequency express bus services (Bus Rapid Transit) on the 
‘managed lanes’, as they are called. The Federal Transit Administration and Federal 
Highway Administration have been promoting congestion pricing in the United States 
since the early nineties but few states were willing to implement it due to political 
concerns. Now, however, after observing the success of the London scheme, several HOT 
lane projects are being planned in different parts of the country. The following section 
describes the equity arguments that make congestion pricing a contentious policy. 
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3.6. Equity Issues with Congestion Pricing 
While pricing is a viable economic instrument to provide choices and manage demand, it 
causes different impacts for different classes of society. This is a challenge because it 
underscores the social inequality especially prevalent in fast growing cities of the 
developing world. 
 
Perhaps the most important political danger with congestion pricing is an inadequate 
resolution of the equity issue.  It is obvious that for congestion pricing to be successful, 
there would be an involuntary change in travel patterns for some people.  Those who 
oppose the policy argue that the people who would be made worse off than they were 
before, would disproportionately consist of lower income people and workers with 
inflexible work schedules, and in case of Mexico City, a large proportion of street 
vendors whose only means of transporting their merchandise is their private vehicles.  
 
There are valid means of addressing this issue, such as redistributing the revenues for 
public transit improvements, as has been done in London, providing discounts on the 
congestion charge, tax credits to the poor, reductions in property taxes, and other 
exemptions based on household income and level of expenditure. However, when 
corruption in the government is considered high, as in case of Mexico City, citizens 
perceive only the immediate negative impacts, with little hope that the revenues will be 
used judiciously to redress the inequities.  It has been argued that existing methods to 
fund transportation investments such as property taxes and sales taxes are more 
regressive and if these were replaced by congestion charges, then in principle, 
transportation finance would become much more equitable than it is today56.  
 
The intent behind congestion pricing is that the increased price of travel will encourage 
people who can do so to alter their travel behavior in any of a number of ways.  This 
could be to take an alternate route that is less crowded, to take public transit, join a car 
pool, or to shift one’s travel time to another when the roads are less crowded.  Some 
travelers may change the origins and destinations of their trips, or forego less important 
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trips, due to the increased cost of congestion they would have to bear.  The resulting 
change will of course, depend upon the particular features of the policy.   
 
The very fact that congestion pricing is about using a market-based theory for a public 
good, that is, about charging people to change their behavior makes it appear coercive 
and restraining, especially to the lower income classes of people.  In that sense, some 
consider it to be an elitist measure, as it does not take into account different sub-groups of 
the typical urban population.  This has become a prominent environmental justice issue; 
however, others argue that it congestion pricing is a better policy than displacing 
households by building highways through communities.  Given these arguments, an 
important political component of the decision to implement a pricing scheme is to 
understand the distribution of winners and losers. Table 3-1 shows the direct groups of 
winners and losers that would result from implementation of congestion pricing. It 
becomes politically difficult to implement because invariably, the number of direct losers 
is larger than the number of direct winners.  
 
TABLE 3-1 Congestion Pricing: Winners and Losers 
 
Direct Winners Direct Losers 
 
 Wealthier motorists who value their travel 
time savings more than the charge costs. 
 Bus and rideshare travelers who enjoy 
improved service due to reduced 
congestion and economies of scale. 
 Recipients of congestion charge revenues 
or incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 Lower income motorists who pay the 
charge because they have no travel 
alternative, but don't value their time 
savings more than the charge costs. 
 Motorists who have to shift to other routes 
to avoid the charge. 
 Users of roads that are not charged, or 
immediately surrounding the congestion 
zone, who experience increased 
congestion. 
 Motorists who forego trips due to the 
charge. 
 Motorists who shift to transit and rideshare 
modes due to the charge (although service 
improvements due to economies of scale 
may make some of these net winners). 
 
Source: Victoria Transport Policy Institute57 
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Congestion pricing also does not necessarily represent a ‘fixed’ approach because after it 
is introduced with certain parameters, a subsequent local government may raise or lower 
charges at will, or abolish or reinstate the charge, for political reasons.  On the other 
hand, when physical restraints such as pedestrian streets or bus lanes are used to manage 
urban traffic, they are likely to be more permanent.  The idea of using these approaches 
together with pricing can work because their goals are similar. 
 
Given the fact that road pricing will affect people living in the DF, the EM, and even the 
states surrounding the MCMA, the success of the scheme will depend on enforcement by 
each jurisdiction, and how the revenues are split between them. The intraregional 
competition between multiple jurisdictions may undermine cooperation and coordination 
efforts, as each authority will seek its own fair share58. This is highly possible in case of 
the MCMA. Since the DF has the comparative advantage of dense metro services as an 
alternative to car use, the revenues from a congestion charge could be used to invest in 
metro extensions to the EM, a constant demand of the EM residents. However, the bone 
of contention is that the EM government is not willing to support the DF authority with 
investment funds for the metro as it receives no share of the fare revenues.  
 
By charging a congestion fee from car users, the transportation authority of the DF 
(SETRAVI) can help “restructure supply”59 in favor of public transport by eliminating the 
hidden subsidies on private automobile users. Politically, the proposal to use congestion 
pricing revenues for extending the metro into the EM, and improving service, would be 
very favorable, as the metro is far cheaper than the colectivos. The colectivos, on the 
other hand, could be offered discounts with a reorganization of service routes and 
creation of special lanes, in return for not raising their fares. Effective public 
communication of the costs and benefits of a congestion charge to different stakeholders 
is essential to gain support for these ideas. 
In the next chapter, we present a detailed discussion of the applicability of congestion 
pricing in the context of Mexico City. 
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CHAPTER 4.   APPLYING THE IDEA TO MEXICO CITY 
 
4.1.  Private Travel in the MCMA 
The private automobile offers desired convenience and status to the relatively higher 
income households in Mexico City. However, few people consider the total costs of 
operating an automobile. Ownership taxes (such as the tenencia in Mexico City), 
depreciation, licensing and insurance costs are regarded as sunk costs. The variable costs 
of using an automobile remain relatively low and unless they are constrained by 
congestion costs, parking costs, scarcity of gasoline or another additional externality cost, 
rising personal wealth will continue to increase the motorization rate. As cars take on 
more of the city’s mode share of trips, metro trips have continued to decline. While there 
are many other reasons for inefficiency of public transit, an obvious disadvantage is the 
implicit subsidy that is provided to private travel at the cost of improving public transit. 
While the level of concern over transit subsidies is always high, seldom is any thought 
given to the large collective subsidy that automobile travel enjoys. 
 
There is a significant perception that demand for private transport in Mexico City is so 
inelastic that only extreme pricing measures would work to change travel behavior, and 
these would not be politically feasible.  The reason for the inelasticity is the rapid 
decentralization of the city, compounded by limited availability of public transport 
options in areas far from employment centers.  Recognizing that congestion pricing is a 
drastic measure but the time may be right for it in Mexico City, in this thesis we attempt 
to understand whether this perception is true.  It is important to bear in mind that any 
form of congestion pricing is best implemented through stakeholder participation, and 
along with other policy measures that may include regulations for the colectivos, 
coordination between the bus and metro systems, and increased parking charges in 
congested areas.  
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4.2.  History of Transport Policies Responsible for Growth in 
Automobile Trips in the MCMA 
 
The number of vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) in Mexico City has increased over the 
last two decades. This is partly due to a trend of policies and circumstances that have 
directly or indirectly led to a growth in vehicle trips. The mode share of the minibuses or 
colectivos increased rapidly from 5.5% to 58.6% between 1986 and 199860. In this period, 
the DF and EM governments had both given out subsidized loans to private colectivo 
operators for modernizing their fleets, replacing the traditional five-passenger pesero with 
the higher capacity colectivo, and switching to unleaded gasoline. In addition, the 
performance of the publicly owned bus company Ruta 100 declined due to lack of funds, 
poor management, competition from the colectivos, and decaying institutional capacity.  
Thus, with this support to private operations, the colectivos soon grew in number as they 
provided the only flexible means of public transport between the downtown areas and the 
suburbs.  
 
In the period 1988 to 1997, colectivo ridership in Mexico City grew from about 6.3 
million trips per day to 15 million61. The operators face limited regulation once given 
permits, and usually fix their own fares on the routes they operate. Colectivo fares in the 
DF are about 30% to 130% higher than fares on the publicly operated metro, trolley bus 
and bus services, while in the EM, fares go up to 430%62. This is highly inequitable since 
most low-income households are located in the EM municipalities, distant from the city 
center and with limited metro or bus access. The colectivos contribute to a significant 
amount of traffic congestion in central city areas, as they idle at stops, competing with 
each other and waiting for passengers.  95% of the colectivo vehicles are now about 8 
years and older, thus they not only contribute to central city congestion but also to 
emissions in a significant way. 
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The private colectivo operators are organized into powerful cartels wielding immense 
political power and they have been pushing for fare increases for a long time. In areas 
where the metro does not provide access, the colectivos provide an important feeder 
service. However, in other areas their routes compete with those of the metro, and people 
often use the colectivos instead of the metro if it will reduce the number of transfers they 
need to make. According to a survey completed in 1997, colectivo operation generates an 
average of 100,000 direct jobs, with each unit having an average daily ridership of 688 
passengers. The colectivo operators therefore represent a powerful stakeholder group that 
will be vocal against a congestion pricing policy, unless they see advantages for 
themselves. 
 
With support from the government, the number of taxis has also grown in recent years 
like the colectivos, though to a lesser extent. To regain political support for the official 
party, the DF government increased the number of taxi permits from 20,000 to 80,000 
between 1988 to 1992. After the formal issuing of permits ended in 1992, an estimated 
10-12,000 ‘pirate’ taxis began to operate illegally with forged papers63. A majority of 
these do not operate from a designated taxi stand, but rather often drive around empty 
looking for passengers, and adding to congestion levels. Today, the DF has 106,000 taxis, 
with an additional 19,000 pirate taxis, according to a recent study64.  The study says that 
the DF may possibly have the highest supply of taxis in the world, with a taxi in the DF 
running vacant between one-third and one-fourth of the time. Insecurity concerns about 
the pirate taxis are high, and local residents consider it quite unsafe to hail an empty 
pirate taxi from the street. In recent times, there have been efforts by the Public Security 
and Transportation authorities in Mexico City to remove pirate taxis from circulation, and 
so far approximately 7,000 pirate taxis have been removed65.  
 
The chief reasons for the growth in the number of colectivos and taxis are the 
inaccessibility of the metro in areas outside the DF, and the decline of the urban bus 
company Ruta-100. The DF bus services were brought under public control from their 
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private origins in the early 1980s.  However, high subsidies and political conflicts led to 
their re-privatization in 199666. The new companies operating the buses have been largely 
unsuccessful in attracting ridership, and this is why the DF authorities are now planning 
new Bus Rapid Transit corridors in the city. 
 
Overall ridership on the metro service too has declined in recent years. Some reasons for 
this are the rapid increase in car ownership and use, the increase in colectivos and the 
shift in population from central city areas to the EM, where the metro has mostly been 
inaccessible. Mexico City’s metro service is the cheapest in the world with a per trip cost 
of US$ 0.20, and ranks first in terms of average number of passengers per kilometer; yet 
it is heavily subsidized. Since 1989, in spite of 37 extra kilometers being added to the 
metro network, its ridership fell from a peak of 4.7 passengers per day to about 4.0 
million in 1999. The fact that out of eight lines, the three oldest lines carry about 60% of 
all metro passengers suggests a major imbalance in the metro network. The metro and 
Ruta-100 bus services used to be integrated to some extent through the Metrocard. 
However, with the demise of the Ruta-100 services, the Metrocard was abolished in 
1997, making travel on public transport costlier for passengers. It is only recently that the 
DF government has proposed plans for expanding metro services in the northwest and 
northeast, to serve these corridors with high demand; however, there is not yet any 
agreement between the DF and EM governments regarding financing of the extensions. 
 
Given the problems with institutions, operations and negative perception of public 
transport, transportation policy in Mexico City in recent decades has focused on building 
more roads to fulfill growing traffic demand. In doing this, the distribution of resources 
between the EF and the DM has been very disparate leading to a conflict of interests 
between both governments, while contributing to increased decentralization of the city. 
Beginning in the 1970s when the first ring road (Circuito Interior) was constructed, 
followed by the creation of high capacity roads called the ‘ejes viales’ through downtown 
Mexico City in 1979-80, and finally the completion of the Periferico, a beltway around 
the DF in the early nineties, the government has been attempting to alleviate congestion 
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through increasing infrastructure capacity. Many of these roads are already very 
congested today, and the Periferico has been described as “a parking lot for much of the 
day” according to a 1998 article in The Economist 67. According to SETRAVI (1999), a 
third ring road is now being built with the northern half constructed as a toll highway 
while the southern half is still under construction68. 
 
Grade separations in the form of flyovers have been introduced to improve flow on 
important routes, with new highways being built in the north (Cuautitlan-Tlalnepantla), 
northwest (La Venta-Lecheria, a tolled highway) and the east. Since these roads bring 
congestion relief in the short term, their construction is considered a popular measure. 
The current administration under Mayor Lopez Obrador, has begun construction of 
elevated second levels (Segundos Pisos) over the existing Periferico ring road and 
another road called the Viaducto in the city, amidst immense controversy and with high 
costs. The first phase of this project cost US$ 80 million, while the second phase is 
expected to require an investment of US$ 200 million69.  
 
This thrust of transport policy has often been called the “black-hole theory” of 
infrastructure investment70. Increased road investments reduce congestion and travel 
times in the short term, altering travel patterns by making travel easier, but they also 
increase average trip lengths and number of trips. In due course, the new capacity falls 
short for the demand induced due to improved travel conditions, congestion begins to rise 
again, and there is need for further road investments. The phenomenon is likened to a 
black hole because in spite of heavy investments, it ultimately has no impact on reducing 
congestion.  While it can be argued that building more roads generates jobs, and provides 
increased access, these benefits are outweighed by the resultant costs of increased sprawl 
in an already very decentralized city. For example, the COMETRAVI study (1999) 
mentions how after a new toll highway in the northwestern part of the MCMA was 
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completed, it led to new residential, industrial and service developments that generated 
increased trips in the area71. 
 
The long distances also make metro extensions very costly. This is one of the reasons for 
the limited reach of the metro network in Mexico City, compounded by the lack of 
cooperation between the DF and EM governments. In addition, road connections between 
the DF and the EM are not designed as part of a system, and have missing links72. So 
while new investments are being made to relieve congestion, there is in fact a greater 
need to improve accessibility for EM residents by filling the gaps in the network.  
 
There has also been no actual implementation of regulation to manage the increasing 
number of colectivos, and only limited expansion of metro service, thus making private 
automobiles the only viable option supported by the government policy of increasing 
road capacity. A new metro line (Metro Line B) running between the downtown and the 
EM, that opened only in the year 2000, has had good ridership up to now and eliminated 
some colectivo trips. Another positive development is the approval of two bus rapid 
transit corridors on the Eje 8 Sur road and the Insurgentes Avenue, two major demand 
corridors in the city. These are currently under construction, and their total budget is US$ 
20 million, in contrast with the US$ 80 million spent in only the first phase of the 
Segundo Piso construction. 
 
Another factor that has led to increasing road congestion in the city is the free on-street 
parking in most congested parts.  The 1994 Origin-Destination Survey showed that the 
highest percentage of the city’s on street free parking is in the DF, comprising one half to 
one third of total parking in the area. Free parking contributes to congestion, and does not 
generate any revenue. In addition, the areas that suffer from most congestion are also the 
centers of business and employment, and most employers in Mexico City provide free 
parking. Parking meters with a charge of US$ 0.20 for 15 minutes have recently been 
installed in some districts such as Zona Rosa. However, since Zona Rosa is an affluent 
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district and provides mostly high-end retail and shopping, the introduction of parking 
meters has not made a significant difference in traffic.  In the Centro Historico district for 
example, parking lots in areas such as Bellas Artes are constantly full, even at the price of 
24 pesos per hour (US$ 2.40).  The price range in other lots in the Centro Historico 
ranges between 12 and 16 pesos (US$ 1.20-1.40)73. Due to the presence of ample free 
parking, either employer-paid or on-street, these lots barely manage to cover their costs.  
This also shows that most Mexicans who own and use cars have low sensitivity to 
parking prices, once they have already invested in an automobile. In other delegaciones 
of the DF, parking meters have faced stiff opposition when proposed, and thus were 
never implemented. 
4.3.  Description of Prior Regulatory Attempts  
The Hoy No Circula program, started in Mexico City in November 1989, was a form of 
restraining car use to reduce air pollution, not to manage congestion.  The program 
prohibits car use by individual motorists for one day of the working week, based on the 
car’s registration number.  Non-compliance with the ban leads to a fine.  The main 
rationale of the program was that on any working day, there would be 20% fewer cars on 
the roads, congestion would be reduced, and average traffic speeds would increase.    
 
This measure has had mixed results. It resulted in an increase of older second hand 
vehicles purchased by lower income households that owned a single car, so that the 
vehicle could be used on they day they faced the driving restriction.  The program 
actually led to an increase in overall vehicle kilometers traveled because of the second 
and third cars that people bought in response.  Critics say that the Hoy No Circula 
increases the cost of commuting by private car in an inefficient way.  The ban on car use 
not only leads to a waste in the car’s capital cost, but also does not allow car drivers to 
trade off the loss in utility in the market74. The higher cost is only manifested in a loss of 
productivity of households, as the money is neither invested in pollution control 
technologies, nor collected by the government for other welfare measures. Thus, the Hoy 
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No Circula is considered quite inadequate as a measure to reduce air pollution, though it 
helps ease congestion to some extent.  Recently, there have been proposals to modify the 
program such that cars older than 1993 are banned on at least two days of the week, 
newer cars are banned on only one day, and cars manufactured after 1999 face no 
restrictions. 
 
The problems of traffic congestion and air pollution are, however, becoming so acute in 
the metropolitan region that since the Hoy No Circula is the only functioning demand 
restraint measure, it is considered better than nothing. According to recent news, 
transportation officials in Toluca, capital of the State of Mexico, are considering the 
application of Hoy No Circula to deal with growing levels of pollution by rationing the 
use of vehicles. 
 
Another regulatory measure proposed by the Secretariat of the Environment (SMA) of 
the DF in 2001 was to ban all vehicles from entering the old city center, the Centro 
Historico. Consultations were held with various stakeholders, after presenting data on 
potential emissions reductions in the city center if vehicles were to be banned. The 
proposal however, did not move ahead due to opposition by many groups, including 
automobile manufacturers and distributors, freight companies and downtown businesses.  
 
Vehicle bans and regulatory measures such as the Hoy No Circula are considered less 
controversial than congestion pricing because they affect all sections of society equally. 
There are other similar methods of demand restraint such as raising the fuel tax or raising 
parking charges. However, these affect all modes of transport and all users for all trips at 
all times of day, creating high inefficiencies or deadweight losses. A parking charge is 
usually not applicable for any specific time period or location unless it is implemented as 
a surcharge for congested zones. An increase in fuel tax does not cause significant change 
in travel behavior because it is often too small in magnitude and spread over a wide 
population base. Congestion pricing is a better approach because it can be used to 
eliminate congestion in a targeted manner through peak hour charges or charges on 
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certain facilities. In addition, it helps capture the high costs of congestion as toll revenues 
that can be hypothecated for other public investments and can generate value.  
4.4.  Arguments for Considering Congestion Pricing in the MCMA 
The residents of Mexico City acknowledge that traffic congestion is a serious problem 
affecting their quality of life, as corroborated by a survey that was conducted as part of 
this research. In fact, in the wealthier areas where car use is high, the limited availability 
of parking spaces is a major problem. According to reports in a local newspaper, a new 
bikeway running through the city’s main Chapultepec Park is being used as a car park by 
people. Traffic is high because there are many restaurants and museums in the area, and 
the bikeway, demarcated by red paving, is nearly full with parked cars, relegating 
bicyclists to the regular streets or sidewalks75.   
The reason for the increase in congestion levels in the MCMA is the rapid growth in 
private automobiles and colectivo traffic.  The colectivo system has especially flourished 
due to the failure of the bus system and lack of expansion of the Metro network in recent 
years.   Since 1960, the low-occupancy gasoline fleet that includes private cars and 
colectivos has grown by 15.5 times, while the high-occupancy diesel and electric fleet, 
including buses, has grown by only 7.6 times76. Figure 4-1 shows the change in daily 
passengers on the major transport modes in the city with a change in GDP over the years. 
FIGURE 4-1 Average Daily Passengers in Mexico City, per mode 
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Low-capacity vehicles such as cars, taxis and colectivos, together had about 70% of the 
trip mode share in 1995.  It is this shift in modal share towards lower capacity modes at 
the expense of bus and metro ridership that is considered the major policy challenge 
facing the city’s transportation system77. 
 
The growth in low-capacity vehicles has significant impacts on air quality as well.  In 
terms of emissions, 50% of sulfur dioxide, 65% carbon monoxide, 40% of nitrogen 
oxides, and 60% of volatile organic compounds are released by private vehicles78.  In the 
absence of viable public transport alternatives, the colectivo system functions as a 
privately run public transport system.  The colectivos are well used because they provide 
frequent access to most parts of the metropolitan area, unlike the metro and bus services.   
Colectivos have the largest mode share of trips, yet the average fares are about double 
that of the bus or metro, and are continually increasing, with the most recent increase 
being in January 2004.  Most people have to travel on more than one mode to get to their 
destinations, usually taking more than one colectivo, leading to high public transport 
costs for the lower and middle-income classes.  The colectivos, thus offer the advantages 
of public transport, but with the negative impacts of excessive competition and 
unregulated growth.  Consolidation and reorganization of the private colectivo services is 
essential so that they act as feeders to the higher capacity public transit modes. 
 
Government run public transport receives high subsidies in Mexico City.  Subsidies cover 
37% of Metro operations and 60% of light rail operations.  Current transportation 
revenues, that include ownership fees, traffic fines, used car sales taxes, and parking fees 
barely cover one-half of total transport expenditure.  More sources of revenue are 
therefore desirable.  The metro is priced extremely low at two pesos per trip, with the fare 
remaining unchanged for several years. In addition, parking fees received from publicly 
run lots and parking meters are limited, since very few parts of the city impose parking 
charges through meters or otherwise.  Congestion pricing can therefore be an alternative 
to explore, since it not only may result in reduction of private vehicle usage but it would 
                                                 
77 Molina, Molina and Alliance for Global Sustainability (2002). p. 226. 
78 Using data from CAM (2001) cited in Molina, Molina and Alliance for Global Sustainability (2002). 
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generate additional revenues that can be invested in transportation improvements, as done 
in the cities of London and Singapore.  
 
The World Bank and the Global Environmental Facility recently approved funding for a 
project to establish Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridors on the city's two major roads, the 
Insurgentes Avenue and the Eje 8 Sur (Axis 8 – South).  This will be an important step 
towards providing public transport alternatives, and would complement potential 
implementation of a pricing policy.  A key argument for congestion pricing in Mexico 
City is that automobile trips are highly concentrated.  Over 60% of automobile trips occur 
within a radius of 10 km from the city center, and 80% of overall trips have their origin 
or destination in the Federal District. According to COMETRAVI (1999), 86% of 
commerce and services are concentrated in the DF forming over three-quarters the 
economy of the entire MCMA.  This leads to a high volume of commuting from the 
surrounding State of Mexico into the DF, leading to heavy congestion during peak hours.  
 
While congestion pricing can take different forms, as an Area Licensing Scheme, road 
toll, peak hour charge, and so on, for area-based congestion pricing schemes such as 
those in London and Singapore, the concentration of urban travel demand in a particular 
geographical area is a pre-requisite.  In the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA), in 
spite of growing decentralization, there is evidence that automobile trips are highly 
concentrated in the DF.  75 to 80% of the vehicles in the MCMA are registered in the DF 
(excluding trucks).  Of the 69,000 taxis registered in the MCMA, 64,000 are registered in 
the DF.  The major freight terminals are located just on the periphery of the DF, and 29% 
of the city’s freight originates in the DF79, leading to serious congestion caused by truck 
traffic especially during peak hours. In addition, the Metro network is confined to the DF 
and the three most heavily used Metro lines have destinations in the DF.  Roughly 21 
million vehicle trips are made in the MCMA today, of which, 14 million are made in the 
DF and 7 million in the EM.  By 2020, the total number of trips is expected to increase to 
28 million, with 17 million trips made in the DF, and 11 million made in the EM80.  
                                                 
79 Molina and Molina (2002). p. 228. 
80 Ibid. 
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This shows that while trips per person in the DF may reduce in future years due to 
growing decentralization, the absolute number of trips made in the DF will grow.  This 
increase of 21% by the year 2020 is significant, in light of the fact that congestion levels 
in the DF are already critical. In Mexico City, the Northern and Eastern roads provide the 
primary access from the suburbs to the DF, and these are the most congested urban 
highways.  Therefore, another alternative could be facility pricing, possibly during peak 
hours or during other times of day when congestion is at a maximum. However, the only 
available data, from the 1994 Origin-Destination survey done in the city, shows that only 
26% of trips were made with origins in the suburban municipalities and destinations in 
the DF. Thus the option of facility pricing would not capture the large volume of trips 
made within the DF itself, between the outer rings and the central zone.  
 
Due to the high trip volumes in the Federal District, the transport authority is considering 
development of elevated toll expressways on the most congested facilities.  However, if 
some form of traffic management using intelligent transportation systems or congestion 
pricing is considered, it is possible that it may lead to more efficient use of existing 
infrastructure, to not warrant the need for these investments. As stated earlier, for a 
congestion pricing policy to be successful, the availability of reliable and accessible 
public transport is essential.  The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridors being constructed 
two of the city’s main arteries provide a key step in this direction, as they are linked with 
the central business district.  These should ideally be fully operational before any form of 
congestion control is instituted. One possibility could be to consider charging for use of 
some lanes on the proposed BRT corridors.  All the options stated in this section are 
possible with varying potential impacts, and deserve further analysis.   
 
The arguments above suggest that if area-based criteria are considered for congestion 
pricing, they would be more viable if applied in the DF area. In such a case, it is 
important for the DF transport authority, SETRAVI to be involved in designing and 
implementing congestion pricing.  SETRAVI operates transit services and road transport 
in the DF and thus would be best equipped to manage the allocation of revenues to other 
required services.  The DF government has recently also passed a law to explore new 
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sources of revenue generation for a transit trust fund81.  The objectives of SETRAVI’s 
Comprehensive Program for Traffic and Transport (2001-2006) are better use of 
resources, enhanced mobility, and preservation of the environment.  Congestion pricing is 
a policy measure that would help achieve all these goals, to some extent, by more 
balanced use of roads between public and private modes, reduction in travel delays, and 
some reduction in emissions.  It could be implemented as a complement to the high-
profile Centro Historico project to improve the old historic center of the city, and the Bus 
Rapid Transit corridors described earlier. 
 
However, before congestion pricing is considered for Mexico City, there are certain 
prerequisites that must be addressed.  These predominantly relate to resolving the equity 
issues that often arise against congestion pricing82. First of all, people must acknowledge 
that congestion is a serious problem in the city, that it leads to a loss in productivity, and 
that the existing situation cannot be permitted to get any worse.  Second, is the issue of 
providing options for low-income car users, who would spend a higher proportion of their 
income on commuting.  Alternatives must be provided in terms of public transport 
improvements, so that those who cannot afford a congestion charge do not face a 
mobility restraint.  Third, is the implementation of complementary measures to reduce 
demand for using private automobiles, such as increasing parking charges in dense urban 
areas, creating pedestrian-only or bus-only zones, and cycling tracks.  Fourth, is to decide 
how the revenues will be used, as this is critical for the perception of equity and for 
mitigating negative distributive impacts.  Finally, extensive public information about the 
impacts of congestion and the motivations for pricing is necessary along with building 
support and negotiating with concerned stakeholders, including government agencies, 
businesses, informal vendors, car owners, automobile manufacturers, public transport 
operators, and so on.   
To begin addressing the equity concerns, it is important to understand the car ownership 
profile of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area. This is discussed in the following section. 
                                                 
81 Molina and Molina (2002). p. 271. 
82 Section 2.5 in Chapter 2 of this thesis presents a detailed discussion on what the equity-related arguments 
against congestion pricing are.  
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4.5.  Growth in Car Ownership in the MCMA 
To establish how critical the equity argument is with respect to congestion pricing, we 
need to understand how car ownership has grown in Mexico City in recent years 
(between 1994 and 2000).  The datasets used to analyze the growth in car ownership are 
the Origin-Destination Survey data from 1994, and census data from the year 2000.  The 
following figures show the various classes of income, represented as a multiple of 
minimum wage, and the percentage of population in each income class that owned at 
least one car in 1994 and 2000.  The data from the 2000 census was available for much 
higher income groups, however for the sake of comparison with data available for 1994, 
these have been excluded.  
FIGURE 4-2 Income and Car Ownership in the MCMA in 1994 
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FIGURE 4-3 Income and Car Ownership in the MCMA in 2000 
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These graphs show the characteristic S-curve of increasing car ownership or motorization 
with increasing income, where car ownership shows a steep rise at the 4 to 5 times 
minimum wage level.  This was the income threshold in 1994, and remained about the 
same in 2000 too.  Detailed car ownership data show that this is also the income level at 
which a second car became affordable for many households.  The 1994 graph shows that 
about 97% of households in the highest income group owned at least one car.  In 
comparison with 2000, this number appears to have reduced to about 90%.   
 
The data for the year 2000 showed a decline in percentage of car owning households at 
extremely high income levels.  It is not clear whether this is a fault of the data due to 
incorrect reporting by the highest income people, or due to some other reason. One factor 
could be the more rapid increase in the number of households in this income group 
relative to car ownership. In literature, however, there is evidence that the motorization to 
income relationship takes the form of the Kuznet’s curve, showing a downturn in 
motorization rate at the highest income levels83. According to the Kuznet’s curve, the 
decline in consumption at high income levels is related to the negative externalities 
associated with heavy consumption (here consumption alludes to trip-making), that 
forces some government regulation. This essentially means that as traffic congestion, 
pollution, travel delays, limited parking, and other inconveniences associated with car 
usage increase, governments will be compelled to enact regulations to restrict travel 
demand. Since the richest households can afford to make use of other alternatives, such 
as changing their housing location to places in close proximity with work places, or using 
a taxi everyday, and so on, the issue of inequity for poorer people would always arise. It 
would be interesting to explore the Kuznet’s relationship further in case of Mexico City 
but it is not directly relevant to the present discussion. 
 
The average income in Mexico City in 1993-94 was about 2 to 3 times minimum wage 
(7410 pesos)84. This is equivalent to the 3 to 4 times minimum wage category in 2000, if 
we consider inflation.  This implies that the middle class income in 2000 would be 3 to 4 
                                                 
83 Talukdar (1997) 
84 Villegas-Lopez (2000) 
 74
times minimum wage.   However, since the middle class covers a wide range from lower 
to upper middle, it is difficult to say at exactly what income level, people will be 
unaffected by a congestion charge.  Above 10 times minimum wage can be estimated as 
the level above which, all households are upper middle or upper class, depending on 
household size.  The table below presents car ownership data from the relevant sources, 
the O-D survey of 1994 and the census data of 2000.  Since the sources of both these data 
sets are not the same, it is possible that measurement errors may have crept in.  However, 
these data give some understanding about the distributive impacts of congestion pricing 
on different income groups of people.  
TABLE 4-1 Number of Households and Car Ownership in 1994 and 2000 
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Car Ownership in 1994
pto 4 times minimum wage 1388964 381779 10.97% 29.80%
4 to 20 times minimum wage 1985542 800466 23.00% 62.48%
bove 20 times minimum wage 105654 98837 2.84% 7.72%
otal 3480160 1281082 36.81% 100.00%
Car Ownership in 2000
pto 4 times minimum wage 1420105 353530 9.27% 25.64%
o 20 times minimum wage 1858573 728314 19.09% 52.82%
Above 20 times minimum wage 536540 296918 7.78% 21.54%
otal 3815218 1378762 36.14% 100.00%
hange in Distribution of Car Ownership with Income between 1994 and 2000
pto 4 times minimum wage 31141 2.24% -28249 -7.40%
4 to 20 times minimum wage -126969 -6.39% -72152 -9.01%
bove 20 times minimum wage 430886 407.83% 198081 200.41%
otal 335058 9.63% 97680 7.62%
No. of car 
owning HH As % of all HH As % of car owning HH
As % of car owning HHAs % of all HH
No. of car 
owning HH
No. of 
Households 
No. of 
Households come Level
come Level
% increase in car owning 
HH from 1994come Level
Increase in HH 
from 1994
% increase in 
HH from 1994
Increase in car owning 
HH from 1994
Comparing the tables above, we find that the number of car owning households has 
doubled in the highest income group (above 20 times minimum wage) between 1994 and 
2000, while the lower and middle classes show a small decline in car owning households.  
If we look at the increase in total number of households, we find a possible reason for 
this.  The number of households in the highest income group has increased by four times.  
This is a huge increase and can be attributed to the fact that due to rising incomes, a large 
number of middle and upper middle class households transitioned to the upper class.  It is 
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thus evident that almost all the growth in car owning households has occurred in the 
highest income group.  The figures below make this point more clearly.  
FIGURE 4-4 Car Owning Households as Percentage of Total Car Owning 
Households in each Income Group 
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FIGURE 4-5 Change in Number of Households and Car Ownership from 1994 to 
2000, by Income Group 
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To understand the decline in lower and middle class car ownership, it is important to 
study how household income has grown between 1994 and 2000.  The daily wage rate 
has increased by 1.5 times in this period, while inflation increased by 2.25 times.  This 
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implies a 23% reduction in real wages.  Thus, we can hypothesize that car affordability 
may have reduced among those classes of the population that are directly affected by the 
wage rate, i.e., the lower and middle classes.  The reduced affordability of cars may have 
contributed to the observed high rise in colectivo mode share, from 49% to 58% between 
1994 and 2000, as colectivos provide more flexibility than other public transport modes 
in Mexico City. 
  
While the decline in lower and middle-income car ownership relative to 1994 is small in 
terms of percentage (Figure 4-4), the absolute numbers of car drivers in these classes is 
large.  This is especially true for the middle class because the largest proportion of 
households fall in that income category.  In the United States, an income level below 
three times the minimum wage is considered low-income. Considering a conservative 
level of five times minimum wage below which households are low-income in the 
MCMA, 12.3% of households in the were low income and owned cars in 2000.  
Considering a level of ten times minimum wage below which households would be 
considerably affected by a congestion charge (middle to lower middle class households), 
21.7% of total households in 2000 come in this category.  This is a significant number, 
due to which the issue of equity in congestion pricing remains difficult to resolve.   
 
There is no doubt that a large number of car users with modest incomes would have to 
bear extra costs, but the important point here is that it is the pace of growth in car 
ownership and use that we are concerned about. Most of the growth in car ownership has 
occurred in the highest income groups in the period 1994-2000, and this is what needs to 
be controlled. Congestion pricing is not an egalitarian policy, yet it can be made so, by 
providing revenues towards ensuring that these households are provided with high quality 
public transport options.  With revenues that can be directly used for transportation 
investments, it may be possible to shift some of these car users to public transport.   
 
About 65% of households in the metropolitan area do not own cars, yet they suffer the 
consequences of congestion, travel delays and unreliable public transport.  Thus, if the 
equity issue in congestion pricing is reframed to consider the majority of households not 
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owning cars at all, the benefits may outweigh the costs.  It may be more politically 
feasible to create discounts, deductions, or credit schemes for lower income households, 
than it will be to control growth in car ownership in the highest income households. 
Incomes are bound to rise with economic growth, and it will always be the upper income 
households that can afford to own and use multiple cars.  Therefore the concern arises 
that since the upper income households will be less sensitive to increased costs, even a 
high congestion charge may not be enough to facilitate a change in their travel behavior.  
 
The steep rise in colectivo mode share and high income car ownership in the last decade 
suggest two priorities for managing congestion: 
 Control of car use through demand restraint measures such as pricing, and  
 Provision of more efficient public transport to serve as an alternative to cars and 
colectivos, including restructuring the colectivo services 
Both these actions must be implemented together.  In recent years, the various 
transportation agencies in Mexico City have been considering public transport 
improvements, such as the Bus Rapid Transit corridors, and expansion of the Metro 
network into the State of Mexico.  The BRT corridors will be an important development 
as they will allow replacement of the colectivos on two high demand corridors, thus 
causing a reduction in colectivo mode share and reducing congestion in parts of the city.  
Policies that transfer colectivo driver livelihoods to the BRT system may have to be 
incorporated if this is done.  Plans to reorganize the colectivo sector have also been 
proposed, however, no consideration has been given to controlling car use to manage 
congestion.   
 
The Hoy No Circula program85 was designed to reduce air pollution, but the coercive 
nature of the policy and the absence of alternatives make it economically inefficient.  It 
also imposes extra costs on car owners by forcing them to not drive on a certain day, 
whereas in case of congestion pricing, drivers can choose to drive and pay a charge for 
essential trips. Congestion pricing will not only reduce travel delays and congestion, but 
the resources generated can be re-allocated for larger welfare, such as public transport 
                                                 
85 Described in Section 4.3 of this chapter. 
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improvements.  This will help ease the mobility restraints that lower income people will 
face. The use of revenues is in fact, one of the important factors that will determine 
support for a pricing scheme.  Considering congestion pricing to be a viable solution in 
the Mexican context, different pricing options are discussed in the next section.  
4.6.  Possibilities for Type of Scheme and Area of Operation 
An analysis of the Origin-Destination Survey data for 1994 revealed that the highest 
number of peak hour trips are made in the central districts of the MCMA.  The maps in 
Figure 4-6 show the district locations that were trip destinations during the morning peak 
hours between 7 to 9 AM.  The dark red shading shows areas that were destinations to the 
highest number of trips, with the lighter shade showing progressively lower number of 
trips.  Data for all hours in the day, from 5 AM to 6 PM were analyzed, and the central 
districts constantly remained dark red, i.e. they were destinations to most trips for most of 
the day.  The picture below reverses during the evening peak hours between 5 to 7 PM, 
where the dark red portion represents origins for largest number of trips.  
FIGURE 4-6 Sample of Trip Destinations During Morning Peak Hour, 1994 
 
Source: Mexico City Network Modeling Group, MIT – Data from O-D Survey, 1994 
 
These maps show that there is indeed a “hot zone”, where trips are destined during 
virtually all hours of the day, up to 6 pm, making this zone the most congested, especially 
 79
during peak hours.  Thus, it may be possible to formulate a charge that would be paid by 
all private vehicles entering this zone during certain hours of the day.  This idea is similar 
to the Area Licensing Scheme in Singapore, where vehicles are charged for driving into 
the central business district, and also the London Congestion Charging scheme, where, 
barring certain special categories of vehicles and taxis, all other vehicles have to pay a fee 
for entering Central London during the day.  In earlier stages of this research, the 
possibility of an area-based charge was not considered because of the assumption that 
employment and trips in Mexico City are quite decentralized.  However, this assumption 
has been proved wrong from the O-D data analysis.  It now appears worthwhile to 
consider a London-type scheme, since the central zone would undoubtedly be most 
congested during a large part of the day. This zone more or less lies in the area bounded 
by the Circuito Interior - a controlled access road. While it is not possible to directly draw 
inferences for Mexico City based on the London case, it appears that an area-based 
charge might be necessary in the MCMA because over 60% of automobile trips occur 
within 10 km from the city center86. 
FIGURE 4-7 ROAD NETWORK IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT 
 
“Congestion 
Zone” DF Boundary
Circuito 
Interior
Periferico
 Source: SETRAVI (2001), Comprehensive Traffic and Transportation Program 
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86 COMETR
 Area-based charging could be considered in the central 21 distritos (districts) of the three 
most congested delegaciones of the DF – Cuauhtemoc, Benito Juarez, and parts of 
Miguel Hidalgo.  These districts comprise most commercial, services, and government 
establishments in the metropolitan area and thus, they are attractions for most of the 
morning peak hour trips.  
 
Congestion in these areas is also caused due to the presence of the highest percentage of 
the city’s on street free parking.  It is about one-half to one-third of the total parking in 
these districts, with much of the rest being employer-paid parking.  Simply charging for 
parking could be one way to reduce the number of vehicles in the area, however, the 
demand elasticity of car use with respect to parking prices is usually quite low. It may not 
be possible to set parking charges that are high enough to deter people from driving to 
these congested parts.   
 
Since car drivers coming to the central parts of the city have mostly never paid for road 
use or parking, it will be important to cultivate a “culture” of paying for road use.  
Parking meters must be installed in these districts, at least to start with. A phased process 
is recommended, whereby parking surcharges are constituted first, followed by area-
based congestion pricing during certain hours, in the central districts of the city.   
 
A proposed Central City Congestion Zone comprising these districts is shown in Figure 
4-8. In later stages, once public response to a congestion charge is known, peak period 
pricing could be implemented on the major facilities linking the EM and the DF, or the 
zone can be expanded up to the Periferico beltway. Facility pricing however, might be 
perceived as a restraint imposed on people from the State of Mexico from accessing the 
Federal District. It is thus better to implement this form of pricing on the proposed Bus 
Rapid Corridors so that there is a good quality travel alternative on the same routes. 
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 FIGURE 4-8 Proposed Congestion Charging Options 
 
 
The area covered by the proposed Central City Congestion Zone, including 21 central 
districts of the DF, is a small proportion of the total metropolitan area. This zone has 
other characteristics that make it viable for pricing measures.  One, the dense Metro 
coverage in this area provides a good alternative to car use.  Although some argue that 
the same people that use cars in this area will never use the metro, the availability of 
reliable public transit is the first prerequisite for implementing pricing in the area.  
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Second, while the large proportion of on-street parking contributes significantly to 
congestion, the initial step of introducing parking meters in the three central delegaciones 
is already underway.  There are other options that can be considered specifically to deal 
with the significant proportion of employer-paid parking in these areas.  An idea that has 
been studied in depth by Shoup and Wilson, generating good results in the Los Angeles 
area, is that of ‘parking cash out’87.  Employer-paid parking contributes to a tendency to 
commute alone to work, according to Shoup and Wilson, thereby increasing traffic 
volumes. In this system, employers pay employees an amount equal to the parking 
subsidy as an incentive for not driving to work. The choice between a free parking space 
and cash makes it clear that parking has an opportunity cost, which is the cash not taken. 
In Los Angeles, the policy has resulted in more people driving in car pools, or using 
public transport in order to avail of the incentive, while the freed up parking space is 
leased out at market values. Parking cash out is a useful idea if considered for parking 
lots; yet, in case of Mexico City, it is on street parking that contributes most to congestion 
in the central areas.  
 
One of the chief issues we need to consider is that of the distributive impacts of a 
congestion charge, and the question of whether a scheme would be progressive or 
regressive. In his essay titled ‘Equity Issues’88, Hodge presents the distinction between 
relative and absolute burden of a tax or user charge. Views regarding equity impacts of a 
proposed scheme depend on whether the absolute or relative burden is considered as an 
indicator 89. 
 
If the absolute amounts are considered in the case of say, a central city congestion 
charging fee or high parking charges in Mexico City, then wealthier households will 
absorb the higher burden as they own and use cars more. This makes the scheme 
progressive. For example, the London scheme is considered to be progressive because 
only about 10% of low income households actually own and use cars, given the heavily 
used public transportation system in the city. 
                                                 
87 Shoup and Wilson (1992) 
88 Hodge, D.  My Fair Share: Equity Issues in Urban Transportation. Essay in Hanson. Ed. (1995). pp.  
361-362. 
89 Ibid. 
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However, if a congestion charge is viewed in terms of proportion of household income 
spent towards it then the relative burden is higher for low-income households, making the 
charge regressive. Due to the socio-spatial segregation seen in Mexico City, the high car 
ownership among people with higher incomes, and inherently geographic nature of traffic 
congestion, an area-based charging scheme is bound to be regressive in the relative sense, 
but progressive in the absolute sense. The goal then must be to introduce certain 
measures that eliminate the proportionally higher burden that low-income households 
will bear.  
 
Some ways to do this could be designed into the policy itself, such as discounts for 
people residing in the charging zone and for taxi drivers, as is done in London. A high 
proportion of lower income households in Mexico City are located in and around the city 
center. For the rest, there could be deductions claimed on income tax, based on the level 
of income. Given the concern that many people in developing countries do not even pay 
taxes, the deduction could be claimed on the vehicle registration fee (‘tenencia’ in 
Mexico City) based on some proof of income such as an income tax return, bank account 
statement or most recent payroll receipt.  
 
There could also be a regulation that allows people to purchase an area-accessing license 
as in Singapore. Anyone applying for a drivers license can have the option of purchasing 
the area license for a fee that would be discounted for people below a certain threshold of 
household income. These however, are ideas that are difficult to enforce and monitor in a 
developing city, unless there is sufficient institutional strength. Corruption and unreliable 
citizen records add to the problem of enforcement. 
 
There are of course, details that will have to be worked out depending on the technical 
features and geographical scope of the type of congestion charging scheme considered. A 
detailed analysis of the different travelers or user groups driving into the central city 
areas, and the purpose of their trips, is central to understanding and demarcating a 
‘congestion zone’. 
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A major challenge before any such scheme is considered is that of improving the image 
of the metro and of public transport in general in Mexico City. Middle and upper class 
travelers are reluctant to use the metro or colectivos for many reasons. The metro stations 
are unsafe, and chaotic with informal businesses and vendors, and their entrances are 
crowded with colectivo operators aggressively looking for passengers, especially during 
rush hours. Petty crimes are often committed in the metro stations, and there is the 
perception that it is meant for the lower classes, since the metro at present mostly reaches 
poor neighborhoods. In addition, relatively lower income people from the EM 
neighborhoods take colectivos to the nearest metro station and then transfer to the metro 
to travel into the DF. Social segregation is high in the city and since most metro riders are 
from the lower socioeconomic levels, people from the middle and upper classes choose 
not to travel with them90. While a lot of these people have to travel to their jobs in the 
downtown, they would rather drive on congested streets than ride the metro. The car of 
course, is also perceived as a symbol of higher social status. 
4.7.  Recommendations for a Phased Strategy   
First of all, it is essential to engage stakeholders, and facilitate rigorous public 
information regarding the costs and benefits of the proposed measures.  The main 
stakeholders that would be affected by congestion pricing would be public sector 
agencies responsible for the initial administrative, operational and enforcement costs they 
would incur, along with responsibilities for revenue allocation. Other interest groups will 
include car owners, colectivo owners, taxi drivers, and freight operators, who would face 
higher operating costs, public transport riders who stand to gain from increased 
investments, businesses and vendors in the central area, residents in and around the 
congestion zone, and indeed, all citizens affected by travel delays and air pollution in the 
city.  
 
The following steps are recommended as a broad phased strategy in considering 
implementation of congestion pricing in Mexico City.  As mentioned earlier, the 
mentality of paying for road use in congested areas can only be cultivated slowly.   Thus, 
                                                 
90 Gilat and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning. (2002) 
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this strategy can be phased over 5 or 6 years.  It is essential that the current transport and 
environment agencies work in close coordination to successfully implement the following 
measures.  A robust institutional setup is necessary to plan, implement and enforce these 
measures.  
 
Step 1: The Bus Rapid Transit corridors in Mexico City are expected to be in operation in 
2005.  By that time, parking charges must be in force in the central delegaciones by 
means of parking meters or manual collection. The charges must be enforced and the 
revenues must be used to improve other transport services.  Throughout this period, 
extensive public information is essential, regarding the costs of congestion and use of 
potential revenues. There are already many ongoing transportation developments in 
Mexico City that set the stage for these recommendations. Installation of parking meters 
in the central delegaciones of the DF has already been proposed. 
 
Step 2: Drawing on the public information, a thorough stakeholder engagement process 
must begin to present analyses about various pricing schemes that could be considered, 
with potential costs, benefits, and distributive impacts of each. To do this, it is important 
to have a good estimate of the demand elasticity of private trips in the city, for each 
income group of travelers. A new Origin-Destination survey would be a first step in 
obtaining this data. In addition, the vehicle registration records of the DF and EM must 
be improved to form a reliable database. 
 
Step 3: As the operation, collection, and use of parking charges becomes efficient, area-
based charging must be considered in the central 3 delegaciones or the 21 distritos 
recommended earlier. The stakeholder engagement process in Step 2 may lead to other 
more viable pricing options not discussed here, for example peak hour pricing on the 
main facilities.  Any option that is considered best under expert scrutiny, and with most 
stakeholder consensus, should be considered.  This will most likely be part of a package 
of measures specifying alternatives for people who would be priced out of driving their 
cars, and the use of revenues.   
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As a first step towards stakeholder engagement, an informal survey was conducted 
among government officials in Mexico City at the Seventh Mexico City Air Quality 
Workshop in January 2004.  The results of the survey are presented in the next section. 
4.8.  Communicating with Stakeholders: Survey Results 
In an earlier stage of this research, there did not seem to be much interest among 
transport professionals in Mexico City with regards to the idea of congestion pricing.  
However, in January 2004, when the idea was introduced to officials in Mexico City at 
the MIT Annual Workshop, it resulted in a 3-hour long open discussion about their 
concerns and questions.  At this time, after the first year of the London Congestion 
Charging scheme, there was a lot more information regarding possible distributive 
consequences.  The fact there is deep concern over the problem of congestion in Mexico 
City is evident.  
 
A survey to answer ten questions in thinking about congestion pricing for Mexico City 
was designed, and it was circulated among the transportation and environment experts 
present on the last day of the Annual Workshop.  These included officials from various 
levels of government agencies, responsible for transportation and environment policies in 
the region such as SETRAVI, SMA, STC, SEMARNAT, CAM, and the Mayor’s office.  
They also included many academics and professional consultants with an interest in 
improving air quality in Mexico City.  The response rate was 69% with a total of72 
responses from the 105 questionnaires handed out.  The respondents included the MIT 
group and other non-Mexicans but their responses have been filtered out in this analysis.   
4.8.1. Purpose of the Survey 
 
The reason for circulating the survey in this forum was to understand the views of experts 
and decision-makers in the city on the issue of congestion pricing.  We expect that a 
congestion pricing policy in Mexico City would involve collaboration between the 
transportation and environmental agencies.  Congestion pricing may have a small impact 
on reducing air pollution.  But air quality being a foremost area of interest in Mexico 
City, we find that the DF’s environmental agency (SMA) works closely with the 
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transportation agency (SETRAVI) to coordinate transportation measures that will help 
reduce emissions in any capacity.  With regards to implementing congestion pricing, it is 
necessary that these people in a position of power are convinced of the idea before it is 
introduced to the public at large.   
 
The survey is useful for understanding the current policy climate and people’s leanings 
with respect to pricing.  It is not a definitive statement of public reactions to the policy, 
but only a tool to help guide my research so my recommendations are better informed.  It 
is widely recognized that thorough public information regarding the costs and benefits of 
congestion pricing is very essential for public acceptability.  The first prerequisite for this 
is that the decision-makers themselves be convinced of the gains from a pricing policy.  
The fact that most of these people also use private cars to commute in Mexico City is 
important as well, in order to understand their “personal” responses.  It is likely that they 
may be undecided about their stand on congestion pricing and its effectiveness, since they 
are directly impacted by the policies they implement.  But by surveying a sample of 
stakeholders who would be among the most vocal and influential opponents to any form 
of congestion pricing, potentially worst-case responses were received.  
 
For most questions that provided different options as possible answers, people were 
asked to rank the options.  This is because in order to understand how congestion pricing 
may be implemented in a carefully sequenced package of measures, the ranking is 
necessary to understand what options people consider more essential at a specific time 
and for a specific purpose.  The various options were designed after a literature review of 
the experiences of cities around the world that have implemented pricing in some form.  
In designing the options, we also reviewed the possible arguments people give when they 
adopt a stand for or against a pricing policy.  One respondent criticized the survey saying 
that it was designed to lead the answer.  But in all questions, there was an option for 
“Other” where people could put down any other choice they felt was important.  
Presenting people with different options to choose from speeded up the response time. It 
also facilitates corroboration of some standard policies usually suggested to alleviate 
congestion that people believe should be considered before congestion pricing.  These 
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include constructing more roads, improving public transport, raising parking fees, and so 
on. We argue that these are not far reaching in terms of impacts, and are only short-term 
solutions.  
 
The questions in the survey can best be answered when the geographical scope and 
technological breadth of the pricing scheme is known, that is, when we know what the 
charges would be, what area or links it would cover, the technology used, the mode of 
payment, and so on.  This is especially true for questions such as which stakeholder 
group would be most resistant to the policy, which agency should lead efforts and how 
effective the policy will be in managing congestion.  However, the responses fit well with 
an intuitive understanding of how people react to pricing policies when they are first 
suggested.  These responses also help anticipate public reactions to specific measures.  It 
is necessary to consider these reactions and adapt policies before they are presented to the 
people. The following analysis disregards the non-Mexican respondents and only 
presents the views of the 50 Mexicans (about 70% of total respondents).  
4.8.2. Detailed Results: Questions and Responses 
 
1) Familiarity with pricing and the problem of traffic congestion in Mexico City 
 
The questionnaire gave a brief overview of the main objectives of congestion pricing and 
what the policy entails.  The results showed that 50% of the Mexican respondents were 
familiar with the concept of congestion pricing and 38% were not completely familiar.  
These results are would not have been affected by the lack of knowledge on congestion 
pricing because the questions were related to standard policy measures that the 
respondents would be expected to understand.  This is indicated by the fact that all the 
questions had responses.  
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FIGURE 4-9 Familiarity with the Issue of Congestion Pricing 
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88% of respondents thought that the problem of traffic congestion in Mexico City is in a 
critical stage today and 12% thought it was a reasonable problem.  Nobody thought that it 
was still not a problem. 
 
FIGURE 4-10 Perception of Traffic Congestion in Mexico City 
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2) Worst Impact of Traffic Congestion in Mexico City 
 
Loss in productivity and overall quality of life was considered the worst impact of traffic 
congestion in Mexico City by 52% of people.  They ranked it #1.  29% of people ranked 
air pollution #1 as the worst impact.  Air pollution and associated health impacts by 
exposure were ranked #2 by 56% of respondents.  Travel delays were ranked #3 by 42% 
of people, followed by high fuel/infrastructure costs, ranked #3 by 28% of people.  
Productivity and quality of life is directly dependent on travel delays.  Even though it was 
a separate option in the questionnaire, if we add them up, we can infer that 63% of 
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respondents ranked the combined option as #1. Overall, the ranking is travel delays, loss 
of productivity and quality of life as #1, followed by air pollution as #2 and high 
fuel/infrastructure costs as #3.  
 
FIGURE 4-11 Ranking of Impacts of Traffic Congestion in the MCMA 
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FIGURE 4-12 Worst Impacts of Traffic Congestion in Mexico City  
(Responses Ranked #1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Responses that cited 
“health effects due to 
pollutants” as the worst impact 
have been included in the Air 
Pollution category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Best Way to Deal With Traffic Congestion 
49% of respondents thought that improving public transport and using physical restraints 
such as bus-only lanes and pedestrian zones were the best way to deal with traffic 
congestion.  11% thought that bans such as the Hoy No Circula were the best.  9% 
thought that congestion pricing was the best way, 9% thought that parking reform was 
most important and only 2% though that increasing road capacity was the best way.  
These were the responses ranked #1.  20% of people thought that the answer lies in using 
a combination of policies, of which improving public transport and using physical 
restraints were as important as higher parking charges in congested areas, these being the 
most popular policies.  
 
The option of higher parking charges was ranked #2 by most respondents (31%), 
followed by improved public transport and physical restraints.  At Rank #3, expanding 
road capacity was picked by 25% of respondents and congestion pricing by 24% 
respondents.  If we only look at the two top ranks together, the best way to deal with 
congestion was to improve public transport and use physical restraints (37% 
respondents), followed by higher parking charges in congested areas (19%).  If we look at 
the two lowest ranked policies together (options 5 and 6), expanding road capacity was 
picked by most people, closely followed by the Hoy No Circula and then by congestion 
pricing.  Expanding road capacity is clearly the lowest choice for measures to manage 
congestion.  The Hoy No Circula program does not appear popular either.  
FIGURE 4-13 Ranking of Preferred Policies to Manage Congestion in the MCMA 
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OPTIONS KEY  92
A - Reform parking policies, introduce 
higher parking charges in congested 
areas 
B - Introduce congestion pricing, applicable 
either during peak hours or on congested 
city roads 
C -  Use traffic bans such as Hoy No Circula 
D - Improve public transport, use physical 
restraints such as bus-only lanes and 
pedestrian zones 
E -  Expand infrastructure and increase road 
capacity 
F -  Any combination of the above policies  
 
 4) Best Option for Raising Revenues 
For raising revenues, congestion pricing was picked by most people, 44% of respondents, 
as the best option, followed by higher parking charges in congested areas, picked by 28% 
of respondents.  2% of respondents suggested that road capacity could be expanded, with 
tolls that would generate revenues.  
FIGURE 4-14     Ranking of Policies Considered Best for Raising Revenues 
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5) Option Most Acceptable to Public 
 
Most people, 37% of respondents, ranked public transport improvements and physical 
restraints as Rank #1.  This was closely followed by expanding infrastructure and 
increasing road capacity, picked by 35% of people.  Only 2% of respondents ranked 
congestion pricing as Rank #1.  If we look at Ranks 1 and 2 together, on average, 33% of 
respondents thought Option D – physical restraints and public transport improvements 
would be most acceptable to the public, followed by expanding road capacity (27%), 
followed by higher parking charges (24%).  In terms of number of people who ranked a 
particular policy 1, 2 or 3 for public acceptability, a ban such as Hoy No Circula was 
considered even more acceptable than congestion pricing as most people ranked it #3.  
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6) Stakeholder Group Expected to Have Most Resistance to 
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and lastly, businesses (6%).  4% of the responses stated “Politicians” in the ‘Other’ 
category as another stakeholder group that would resist the policy. 
 
FIGURE 4-17 Ranking of Stakeholder Groups Expected to be most Resistant to 
Congestion Pricing 
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7) Use of Pricing Revenues 
 
60% of respondents ranked road and public transport improvements as #1, followed by 
24% of respondents who thought the revenues should be used to set up a general fund for 
health, education and welfare projects. 10% thought the revenues should be used for 
increasing institutional capacity in terms of physical resources and human skills.  6% of 
respondents were in favor of using the revenues for tax reductions/subsidies such as 
reduction in the car ownership tax ‘tenencia’.  These are the percentages for Rank 1. This 
is broadly the ordering of preferred responses even if we look across all the ranks.  
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FIGURE 4-18  Highest Preference for Use of Congestion Pricing Revenues    
(Responses Ranked  #1) 
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8) Agency that should Lead Efforts to Implement Congestion Pricing in  Mexico City 
 
Most people thought that all the agencies should collaborate.  The choices included the 
Mayor’s office, the transportation agency for the DF (SETRAVI), the environmental 
agency for the DF (SMA), the metropolitan transport agency (COMETRAVI) and the 
metropolitan environmental agency (CAM).  40% of respondents answered “All these”.  
20% thought that the lead should be taken by the Mayor’s office, the way it is in London.  
16% thought that the CAM should be responsible, followed by the SETRAVI (6% 
respondents) and lastly the SMA (8% respondents).  Some people pointed out that the DF 
And the EM agencies should work together with the metropolitan level agencies.  
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FIGURE 4-19  Highest Preference for Implementing Agency  (Responses Ranked  #1) 
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9) Biggest Challenges for Implementing Congestion Pricing in Mexico City 
 
For options ranked #1, the highest percentage of respondents, i.e. 32%, considered public 
resistance as the biggest challenge.  25% considered political conflicts as the biggest 
challenge, followed by 21% respondents who thought the main problem was fragmented 
institutions.  Lack of alternatives to driving was considered a major problem by 10% of 
respondents.  While the lowest percentage of people thought that poor enforcement 
should rank #1, a significantly higher percentage thought that it should rank #2 or #3.  
Thus, overall, the top 3 ranks showed that most people consider political conflicts the 
biggest problem, followed closely by public resistance.   
 
This is followed by fragmented institutions, then by poor enforcement and finally by lack 
of alternatives to driving.   In fact, if we look at the lowest ranked options together (ranks 
6 and 7), vandalism of traffic cameras and installations was considered the least 
important issue (by 35% of respondents), followed by lack of funds (24% of 
respondents).  If we only consider the lowest rank (rank 7), more than half the 
respondents (55%) ranked vandalism of traffic cameras as the last rank, showing that it 
was the least important issue, followed by lack of funds (20%).  
 
FIGURE 4-20  Ranking of Main Challenges to Implementing Pricing in the MCMA 
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FIGURE 4-21  Most Important and Least Important Challenges 
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10) Other Insightful Responses 
 
For the best way to deal with traffic congestion in Mexico City, one respondent 
introduced the policy of ‘controlled hours for delivery trucks, say 3-6 am and 7-10 pm’ as 
an option to deal with congestion.  She ranked it #3.  She reformed Option A to include 
payments for parking violations, added to higher charges in congested areas and ranks it 
#1.  She reformed Option C to increase the number of days a vehicle is banned in the Hoy 
No Circula program and to include taxis and colectivos too.  She ranked this option #2.  
She said that a public campaign should be launched in the media, TV, radio and 
newspapers to people about the implications of reckless driving and lack of respect for 
driving rules on health, quality of life, transport expenses, and so on.   
 
Another respondent introduced the idea of strict enforcement and making drivers abide 
by laws such as having microbuses use only one lane of the road.  One respondent 
modified Option E – expanding infrastructure and road capacity, to include toll roads.  
Then, in the question about which option would be best for raising revenues, she ranked 
the toll road option as #2 after congestion pricing.  
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One respondent said that corruption was the biggest challenge in considering a pricing 
policy for Mexico City.  Since people had limited trust in the government, it would be 
assumed that any additional tax would be stolen by a group of people and would not be 
used to benefit society.  Also, if more fines or taxes were imposed, it would lead to 
increased bribery and corruption.  She said that people would prefer using free congested 
roads to using congestion-free toll roads, which are very expensive so very few people 
use them.  She mentioned raising the gasoline tax and using the funds to improve the 
quality of fuel as a way to improve air quality.  Two respondents pointed out that lack of 
security in public transport is a major challenge and the fear of being assaulted is the 
reason people prefer to use private vehicles.  Another respondent said that the biggest 
challenge was the lack of sound policy instruments.  
 
Two respondents suggested that for the question on biggest challenges, the options might 
have causal links with each other.  For example, public resistance and lack of alternatives 
to driving may be the same problem, the latter being the cause of the former.  Similarly 
fragmented institutions and political conflicts may be directly related.  I looked at the 
analysis again after combining these sets of options.  If we look at the top two ranks, 
highest percentage of people said the biggest challenge was the combined option of 
public resistance/lack of driving alternatives, followed by the combined option of 
fragmented institutions and political conflicts, then by poor enforcement.  Thus, the main 
results remain the same.  It is not the lack of resources, poor enforcement or vandalism 
that is the main challenge to overcome, as one would imagine for a developing world 
city.  Rather, it is the deeper problems of institutions, politics and traveler mindsets that 
will lead to resistance. 
4.8.3. Summary of Survey Results 
The results from the survey directly inform the following two research questions stated in 
Section 1.5 of this thesis: 
 Would congestion pricing be effective in improving urban transport in Mexico City?  
 If so, what opportunities and constraints would be faced in implementing it? 
 How can the various stakeholder interests be addressed to make the policy publicly 
and politically acceptable in Mexico City? 
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Many transportation experts disregard the policy of congestion pricing on the grounds of 
equity, more so in the developing world where social and income inequalities are very 
high.  There is limited institutional coordination, limited resources, lack of alternatives to 
using the private vehicle, poor enforcement of traffic and parking regulations, higher 
rates of crime and vandalism of public property and a higher number of low-income car 
drivers.  These challenges are usually generalized across large and rapidly growing cities 
of the developing world.  However, only some of these are true for Mexico City.  The 
survey results show that the lack of funds, vandalism, or lack of alternatives to driving, 
are far lower on the list of most important challenges than public resistance, fragmented 
institutions or political conflicts.   
 
Only 22% of total trips in Mexico City were made by private car in 1995.  Colectivos and 
buses were used to make 55% of the trips in 1995.  INEGI’s Origin-Destination Survey 
of 1994 showed that only 36% of total households in Mexico City are at the income level 
where they can afford to own and use cars.  Thus, if 64% of the households do not own 
cars and use public transport (includes colectivo, bus and taxi trips), then there is the 
potential to design a fair pricing policy where revenues from charging car users are 
usefully diverted to improve public transport, as done in the London Congestion 
Charging scheme.  
 
It appears that public resistance to congestion pricing in Mexico City is more an issue of 
driver ‘culture’ or ‘mindset’ than of lower income.  Drivers currently use their cars with 
minimal out-of-pocket costs.  The extra costs they experience through congestion are not 
tangible or quantifiable and hence they are simply not known.  Therefore, the equity issue 
in case of Mexico City is the reverse of what we see in many American cities.  There are 
few low-income drivers.  People with higher incomes drive and those with lower incomes 
use the buses, colectivos or the metro.  It is fairer and more equitable to charge low 
capacity cars in order to improve the high capacity modes used by most of the population.   
 
The Government of the DF is already implementing bus rapid transit on two busy 
corridors in the city, to be in operation by the middle of 2005.  An integrated transport 
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strategy of consolidating colectivo trips into improved bus transportation, parking 
reforms and congestion pricing may be the way ahead for reducing traffic congestion in 
the city.  The acknowledgement that congestion is a serious problem in Mexico City is a 
primary step for this.  We have seen from the cases of London and Singapore that when 
congestion pricing is initially implemented, it invariably faces public resistance.  But 
when the revenues are used for larger visible benefits then the idea seems more positive.  
Unlike a gasoline tax that is applied to a larger population base with smaller per capita 
effect, a congestion charge is better directed at a smaller base with higher impact.  The 
London Congestion Charging scheme has actually proven itself progressive in this regard 
and important lessons can be drawn from its first year of implementation. This section 
discusses the results of the survey in detail.  The main points are summarized below.  
 
1)  There is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the idea of congestion pricing, even 
among experts.  Public information regarding the motivations for congestion pricing 
is very important.  
2)  It is clearly acknowledged that traffic congestion in Mexico City today is a critical 
problem.  
3)  The worst impact of traffic congestion is on quality of life and lack of productivity 
resulting from travel delays.  Air pollution ranks next.  
4)  The best way to deal with traffic congestion is to improve public transport and have 
physical restraints such as bus-only lanes and pedestrian zones.  Increased parking 
charges in congested areas ranked after this.  A combination of policies was 
considered important.  
5)  Congestion pricing was considered the best option for raising revenues, followed by 
higher parking charges.  
6)  The measure most acceptable to people would be to improve public transport and use 
physical restraints, closely followed by expanding road capacity.  Congestion pricing 
was ranked lowest.  
7)  Car owners would be most resistant to a pricing policy followed by colectivo/taxi 
drivers.  
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8)  The revenues from a possible pricing scheme would be best used for road and public 
transport improvements, that is, they ought to remain within the transportation sector 
itself.  
9)  All transportation and environment agencies should coordinate efforts with regard to 
a pricing policy.  When singled out, the Mayor’s office was considered best to take 
the lead.  
10) Public resistance was considered the biggest challenge in implementing congestion 
pricing, followed by political conflicts.  
 
These results are intuitive and match with the initial conditions present in other cities 
where congestion pricing has been implemented.  They are useful to understand what the 
next steps are for resolving the congestion problem in Mexico City, whether towards 
improving institutional coordination between the different level of transport and 
environment organizations, improving public transport, modifying the Hoy No Circula, 
or others.  The results show that traffic congestion is a serious problem by itself.  
Strategies to resolve it need not hinge on air quality control measures.  Reducing 
congestion obviously has significant positive impacts on emissions reduction, but not to 
the same scale.  This is especially true because a congestion pricing scheme, if 
implemented, must initially be small in scale.  When its impacts are ascertained, then it 
can be expanded or altered, as is being considered for London now.  
 
After this detailed background on transportation in the MCMA and a sample of responses 
from Mexicans towards congestion pricing, let us now try to quantify some impacts that 
might result from a pricing policy. The next chapter presents different levels of analysis 
to estimate potential reductions in trips, and emissions, resulting from the introduction of 
a ‘congestion zone’ as recommended in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL IMPACTS 
5.1.  Objective of Analysis  
The goal of the work presented in this chapter is to empirically estimate the possible 
savings in travel time, reduction in trips, and reduction in emissions by private 
automobiles in Mexico City as a result of implementing an area-based congestion pricing 
scheme as described in Chapter 4. The data used here is from the Origin-Destination 
survey (O-D) for Mexico City conducted by the National Statistics Institute (INEGI) in 
cooperation with the Federal District in 1994. The O-D survey was based on 135 distritos 
(districts), representing a 135*135 origin-destination matrix, with information on 29.1 
million trip segments. The households that surveyed were demographic samples 
representing the entire population of the metropolitan area. This is the latest O-D survey 
conducted for Mexico City, with previous such surveys done in 1977 and 1983.  
 
There are obvious limitations of using these data for our analysis, as at the time of this 
research, the data are already 10 years old. Yet, they provide an important understanding 
of the mobility picture at that time, from which trends for the future can be determined. 
In addition, the mode split for public transport obtained from the survey is likely to 
contain a high degree of error because the data refer to unlinked trips, or segments of a 
trip made on a single mode of transport. The number of trips on the publicly controlled 
modes – metro, trolley bus, light rail and Ruta 100 bus were based on ticket sales and 
turnstile registers. However, the data for privately operated modes such as cars, taxis and 
colectivos, were based on the number of vehicles in circulation and their estimated 
occupancy rates, thus introducing a likely error91. 
 
The survey provides a snapshot of travel demand in the MCMA in 1994 and its results 
can be used to understand the factors affecting demand such as income, distance between 
origin and destination, trip duration, availability of public transport, and so on.  We can 
thus suggest how demand would change in the future with changes in these influencing 
                                                 
91 Connolly. P. (2000) 
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factors.  After studying the data from the O-D Survey, we selected 21 central contiguous 
distritos (districts) in the Federal District (DF) bounded in whole or part by the Circuito 
Interior (inner ring road) to form a potential ‘congestion zone’ for the purpose of 
analysis. This is shown in Figure 5-1. The distritos part of this zone, are destinations to 
the maximum number of work trips in the metropolitan area and are listed in Table 5-1. 
They also include the main nodes of business and commerce in the metropolitan area.  
FIGURE 5-1  Map of Federal District Showing Metro Network and Central Areas 
 
 
Proposed suburban rail 
line (Tren Suburbano) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend 
 
Federal District (DF) Boundary 
Delegacion Boundary 
Area bounded by Circuito Interior (proposed congestion zone) 
Area showing four central most congested delgaciones 
Existing Metro Network 
Proposed Metro Extension 
New Metro lines proposed 
Boundary of Centro Historico 
 
Source: STC (1999), Plan de Empresa 2000-2006
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TABLE 5-1 Distritos with the Highest Trip Attractions in the Federal District: 
Partially or Completely Located in proposed Congestion Zone 
 
 Distrito No. Distrito Name Total trip attractions % of total
1 Zocalo 567,160 2.76%
2 Zona Rosa 473,098 2.30%
3 Buenavista 238,997 1.16%
4 Tlatelolco 154,124 0.75%
5 Morelos 241,392 1.17%
6 Colobrera 254,242 1.24%
7 Condesa 256,415 1.25%
8 Chapultepec 379,870 1.85%
9 Las Lomas 225,778 1.10%
11 Anahuac 262,621 1.28%
33 Balbuena 305,326 1.48%
37 Reforma Iztaccihuatl 170,466 0.83%
38 Villa de Cortes 161,669 0.79%
39 Portales 229,357 1.11%
40 Del Valle 341,179 1.66%
41 Ciudad de los Deportes 248,370 1.21%
42 Vertiznarvarte 220,867 1.07%
43 Plateros 141,032 0.69%
44 San Angel Inn 382,344 1.86%
64 Ciudad Universitaria 309,926 1.51%
65 Viveros 268,258 1.30%
Total attractions 20,573,725 28.35%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The original O-D Survey consists of a 135*135 matrix with information about trips on all 
modes from 135 origins and destinations, at the distrito level for the DF and at the 
municipality level for the EM. To study the applicability of a zone-based charge, a subset 
of the original O-D dataset was used for this analysis. This included only the trips made 
by cars and taxis (considered to be private modes) in the morning peak hours between 7 
AM to 10 AM to selected central distritos in the DF. The trips were not separated by trip 
purpose because these distritos receive high trip volumes for most of the day. However, 
of all trips that are made to this area for various purposes such as work, shopping, 
recreation, trips back home, and so on, we can reasonably assume that most trips made 
between 7 AM and 10 AM would be work or study trips. The distritos having the highest 
concentration of jobs and businesses in the MCMA are all in the DF, and are part of the 
congestion zone considered for this analysis. These include Zocalo, Morelos, Zona Rosa, 
Condesa, Chapultepec, Anahuac, Del Valle, and Ciudad de los Deportes. 
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The data included trips made from all 135 origins in the city from the DF and the EM, to 
21 central DF distritos. Thus, a 21*135 O-D matrix was analyzed for which public or 
private trip data was available.  Those O-D pairs for which no public or private trip data 
was reported were left out.  From the total trips made to between each O-D pair, the 
private (cars and taxis) and the public mode split was calculated. The public modes 
included the colectivos, buses, light rail, trolley bus, metro, suburban train, and all 
combinations of these modes. 
 
Regressions were run under different conditions between the following variables, in order 
to determine their impact on private mode share for all trips whose destination was in the 
‘congestion zone’ considered. Thus, the dependent variable was the private transport 
mode share of trips to the central distritos, and the independent variables used were: 
INC: Average per capita income in the origin delegacion or municipality 
DUR: Duration of trip 
COST: Cost of driving from origins to destinations in city center (excludes parking cost) 
 
Multivariate regression analysis was done to examine the relationship of these factors to 
the use of private modes. Data from the origin-destination survey represent a wide 
difference in origins even if the destinations in the analysis are all considered to be within 
the same central zone. The data are highly scattered, leading to a high standard error if we 
actually try to estimate values and build a predictive model. Thus, this analysis will focus 
on establishing correlations between the factors affecting private mode share under 
several conditions, and on understanding how well the chosen factors explain the 
observed variance in private mode share of trips. 
5.2.  Assumptions 
Private mode share included all trips made by cars and taxis to the central areas of the 
MCMA. Origin-Destination (O-D) pairs where all reported trips were made using public 
modes had a private mode share equal to zero, and public mode share equal to one. The 
private mode share was considered as the dependent variable rather than simply the 
number of private trips, because the mode share represents the data in a normalized form 
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that can be compared across O-D Pairs. The private mode share equals the fraction of 
trips made using private modes of all reported trips between an O-D pair. Since we are 
only interested in the factors affecting private mode choice, using the normalized data 
also ensures that the size of the distrito does not affect the results. For example, a larger 
distrito would have more private trips simply because it has more destinations, even if the 
trip cost is very high. 
 
Considering an average round-trip length of about 50 km (about 31 miles) per day92 and 
an average mileage of 10 km per liter at a fuel price of 1.7 pesos per liter93, the cost of 
driving was assumed to be 0.175 pesos per kilometer in 1994. This value was multiplied 
by the distance between origin-destination pairs to obtain the generalized trip costs. The 
trip cost represented only the monetary cost of driving a private vehicle into the central 
distritos of the DF, thus the value of travel time and other out-of-pocket costs such as 
parking charges were not included. Although taxis are actually more expensive for a 
traveler than driving a personal car, for the purpose of this analysis, cars and taxis were 
assumed to have the same cost for all trips.  This is a reasonable assumption considering 
that any extra costs due to a congestion charge could be transferred to taxi passengers just 
as car owners bear extra costs. This is, of course, not necessarily the case and depends on 
the particular design of the congestion pricing scheme. 
 
 In London, taxi drivers are exempt from paying the congestion charge because they are 
considered to offer a public transport service.  However, in the context of Mexico City 
where the taxis are responsible for much of the traffic congestion in the city center, an 
exemption would only increase the number of taxis in operation. Also, the aim of this 
analysis is to show the impact of a change in cost (an increase due to a congestion 
charge) on trips made by taxis and cars. Thus, the original value of cost considered for 
taxis and cars will not make any difference. 
                                                 
92 Average trip length was 55 km in the United States in the year 2000 and 39 km in western Europe (see 
Hanson, metropolitan expansion).  A few Mexicans who were interviewed said they drove 40-50 km in a 
day on average. Thus 50 km was considered a conservative value to start with. 
93 The current gas price of 7 pesos per liter was deflated to 1994 values using the CPI data for Mexico to 
estimate this value. Different sources showed values ranging from 1.4 to 1.7 pesos per liter. However, since 
this value will be constant, it does not result in any change in the analysis results. 
 107
The data for per capita income were only available aggregated at the delegacion level for 
the DF and the municipality level for the EM. The aggregated values were used to 
determine approximate income in the distrito or municipality where the trip began. The 
same analysis would have been more accurate if done with household income data 
disaggregated at the level of the O-D survey; however, due to time constraints, the 
aggregate values were used as a proxy for per capita income data in each zone. 
Average trip duration for trips made by car between the O-D pairs was available, and was 
considered to be the same for both cars and taxis. 
5.3.  Results of Regression Analyses 
The discussion in this section is based on two components of the regression results. The 
first component comprises the correlations between various variables, showing the 
strength of the relationship between them. These are zero-order correlations, which 
means that they take into account the effect of the other variables. The second component 
consists of the beta coefficients showing the impact of change in the dependent variable 
(private mode share) for a unit change in the independent variable, what can be called the 
elasticity. 
 
We run the first regression on trips made from all origins in the MCMA to the 21 central 
distritos forming the assumed ‘congestion zone’. The results are shown in Table 5-2. The 
three factors, trip duration, trip cost and per capita income, explained the variance in 
private mode share only moderately, by 44% (R2=0.44, 99% confidence). The resultant 
beta coefficients show that the factor affecting private mode shares most was trip 
duration. The aggregate per capita income of the origin distrito was relatively less 
important in predicting private mode share, and the generalized trip cost was least 
important. We can thus infer that the cost of time spent by travelers in traffic is 
considered higher than the variable monetary cost of driving or using a taxi. 
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TABLE 5-2 Regression Results for Trips from All Origins to Central Distritos 
   Correlations and Descriptives Standardized Coefficients 
REGRESSION ON VARIABLES PRIVATE DURATION COST INCOME Beta t-ratio Sig. 
All origins to central 
distritos DURATION 0.608       0.616 38.808 p < 0.01
  COST -0.220 -0.006 *     -0.136 -7.702 p < 0.01
  INCOME 0.211 -0.052 * -0.437   0.184 10.422 p < 0.01
  Mean 0.29 27.76 0.97 35133.45 Adjusted R2  0.443 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 
2219 Std. Deviation 0.33 30.01 0.58 41298.98 Standard Error 0.247   
Dependent variable: PRIVATE 
Independent variables: DURATION, COST, INCOME 
*  Correlation or beta coefficient is not significant 
 
The analysis shows that travelers whose trips would take longer were more likely to use 
private modes. We also see that the trip duration does not relate with the distance 
between an origin and destination pair and can therefore be assumed to be dependent on 
other conditions directly affected by traffic congestion, such as traffic speed.  We know 
that trip duration is dependent on factors other than distance because the correlation 
between duration and trip cost is not statistically significant. There is negligible 
correlation between them, and this is evident in all the regression results shown in this 
section. Since the trip cost in all cases is directly proportional to the distance and is 
derived by multiplying the distance by a constant fuel mileage factor, it can be concluded 
that the trip duration has no significant correlation with distance in this data set.  
 
A glance at the data shows that even O-D pairs with short distances between them have 
long trip durations if either the origin or destination or both are located in the central 
areas of the DF that are known to be very congested. Congestion is thus responsible for 
higher private mode shares as it makes trip durations longer. 
 
However, the three factors - income at origin, trip duration and trip cost, still leave about 
56% of the variance in private mode shares unexplained if we consider trips from all 
origins to the central distritos. This variance may depend on other factors such as 
availability of public transport at the origin, geographical segregation between low 
income and high-income residential areas, and so on.   
 109
One indication of this is the correlation between income per capita and trip cost as seen in 
the table above. The correlation coefficient between them is statistically significant  
(p-value < 0.01) and equal to –0.437. This shows that as income at the origin decreases, 
the trip cost increases. Since trip cost is directly proportional to distance, it implies that 
the trip cost is higher for low income origins that are farther away from the central areas 
of the DF. To capture the effects of some of the other factors, several regressions were 
performed on data selected according to particular criteria. The difference in correlation 
and R2 values indicated the added or reduced impact of particular criteria.  
TABLE  5-3  Regression Results for Trips to Central Distritos from Origins in the 
Estado de Mexico (EM) and from Origins in the Distrito Federal (DF) 
    Correlations and Descriptives Standardized Coefficients
REGRESSION ON VARIABLES PRIVATE DURATION COST INCOME Beta t-ratio Sig. 
Trips from origins in 
the EM DURATION 0.736       0.711 31.247 p < 0.01
COST -0.131 -0.073 *     -0.042 * -1.84 p = 0.066 (low accesibility to 
public transport) INCOME 0.280       0.114 -0.191   0.19 8.222 p < 0.01
  Mean 0.23 28.34 1.38 16738.34 Adjusted R2  0.581 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 
822 Std. Deviation 0.34 37.03 0.59 13732.19 Standard Error 0.221   
Trips from origins in 
the DF DURATION 0.522       0.548 25.144 p < 0.01
COST -0.197 0.053 *     -0.153 -6.344 p < 0.01(high accessibility to 
public transport) INCOME 0.176      -0.106 -0.436   0.167 6.908 p < 0.01
  Mean 0.33 27.42 0.72 45957.20 Adjusted R2  0.344 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 
1397 Std. Deviation 0.32 24.98 0.41 47775.77 Standard Error 0.258   
Dependent variable: PRIVATE 
Independent variables: DURATION, COST, INCOME 
*  Correlation or beta coefficient is not significant 
 
In the next step, we repeat the same regression on two sets of O-D pairs, one with all 
origins in the EM and the other with all origins in the DF. For this, a dummy variable was 
created that took the value 1 if a trip origin was located in the DF, and 0 if it was not.  
The results in Table 5-3 show that the EM municipalities are typically not well served by 
public transport, while the DF distritos have high accessibility to public transport. We 
find that the three variables, trip duration, trip cost, and income at origin, explain the 
private transport mode share much better for EM origins, and worse for DF origins, than 
in the previous analysis when all origins were considered. 
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For the EM origins, the three factors explained 58% of the variance in private mode share 
(R2=0.58, 99% confidence). In case of the EM, private mode share is more strongly 
correlated with trip duration and per capita income than in case of the DF. Since people 
from the EM have to travel longer distances than those in the DF to the central areas, it is 
intuitive that their choice of mode would depend more on the time it takes to make the 
trip. The DF also has a more homogeneous income profile than the EM.  Therefore, the 
use of cars depends more on per capita income in the EM than in the DF. Trip cost, on 
the other hand, shows a weaker correlation with private mode share in the EM than in the 
DF, and the beta coefficient for it is not significant. This is important because it shows 
that demand for private transport in the EM is inelastic with respect to trip cost, and can 
be explained by the relative absence of better transport alternatives.  
 
Another reason for a weaker correlation with trip cost (-0.191) is that trip cost is 
proportional to distance and the EM municipalities are all similarly distant from the city 
center, whereas within the DF, those living nearer to the central areas have higher 
incomes than those living farther away, as seen from the higher negative correlation  
(-0.436) between income and trip cost in the DF distritos. The trip duration and trip cost 
are again not significantly correlated, showing that trip duration depends on conditions 
other than distance, such as low traffic speed, poor infrastructure, and travel delays. 
TABLE  5-4 Regression Results for Trips to Central Distritos from Origins with 
High Public Transport Demand 
    Correlations and Descriptives Standardized Coefficients
REGRESSION ON VARIABLES PRIVATE DURATION COST INCOME Beta t-ratio Sig. 
DURATION 0.797             0.774 46.685 p < 0.01 
COST -0.307      -0.162          -0.157 -8.745 p < 0.01 
Trips from all origins 
having high public 
transport mode share INCOME 0.107 -0.025 * -0.380   0.068 * 3.818 p < 0.01 
  Mean 0.04 12.33 1.11 27604.37 Adjusted R2  0.671 p < 0.01 
No. of observations = 
1241 Std. Deviation 0.08 24.32 0.60 35139.89 Standard Error 0.044   
Dependent variable: PRIVATE 
Independent variables: DURATION, COST, INCOME 
Only those cases selected where PRIVATE <0.25, implying public transport mode share >0.75 
*  Correlation or beta coefficient is not significant 
The next idea we studied is what governs private travel demand in those areas of the city 
that have good accessibility to public transport, and where many more people use public 
transport rather than cars or taxis.  For this, a dummy variable was created that took the 
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value 1 if public transport mode share was greater than 75%, and 0 otherwise. Only those 
O-D pairs where the dummy variable took the value1 were considered in the analysis. 
 
On running the regression, it was found that the three independent variables explained 
67% of the variance in private mode shares (R2=0.67, 99% confidence) in area where use 
of public transport was high, showing a stronger relationship than we have seen so far 
(see Table 5-4). In all such areas, the use of private modes was most highly correlated 
with trip duration, showing that even if public transport was available, low traffic speeds 
and travel delays prompted people to use private cars and taxis. The trip cost had a higher 
correlation than income, showing that the use of private modes depended more on the 
distance traveled than on the income of the travelers.  
 
These results are important because they indicate that even if the image of the public 
transport network in Mexico City is improved significantly, as long as travel delays are 
not reduced, people will continue to use private modes, especially those living farther 
from the city center. The results from the O-D survey showed that while the average 
journey time in Mexico City was 46 minutes for all modes, it was 35 minutes for trips 
made by cars only, and 50 minutes for trips made by public transport only94. In Mexico 
City, about 80% of all trips occupied road space (all combinations of trips, except ‘metro 
only’ trips)95, with over 60% of total trips made on road-based public transport. It is thus 
clear that one of the main maladies affecting public transport trips in the city is the delay 
caused due to congestion.  Improving public transport is still not the answer to reducing 
congestion in the city; rather, it is essential to recognize the finite capacity of available 
infrastructure, and explore alternative means for enhancing mobility. 
 
These results summarize how particular factors such as driving cost, per capita income, 
journey time, and availability of public transport affect the use of private transport to 
travel to the central areas in Mexico City. In the following section, estimates of the 
potential reduction in automobile trips to the city center and in resulting emissions are 
                                                 
94 Connolly (1999) 
95 Sussman and Gamas-Buentello (2004) – Draft paper 
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calculated. These estimates are based on different values of the demand elasticity and 
congestion charge.  
5.4.  Results of Sensitivity Analyses 
The regression results above explain the relationships between various factors and their 
impact on mode share of private transport for all trips made to the central distritos of the 
Federal District in the MCMA. 
 
In this section, we will focus on illustrating how the number of automobile trips would be 
reduced if a zonal congestion charge were applied to the central distritos roughly 
bounded by the Circuito Interior. The reduction in trips depends upon the demand 
elasticity with respect to price (here, trip cost) in the metropolitan area. The demand 
elasticity is defined here as the percentage change in trips caused by a 1% change in the 
trip cost. The elasticity will differ between sub-groups of the population based on their 
income. It is usually higher for people with lower incomes since they are more sensitive 
to an increase in price, and are more likely to change their behavior if extra costs are 
imposed.  
 
The demand elasticity will also differ based on the purpose of the trip. Trips for work and 
study purposes are typically less elastic than trips for shopping, recreation or similar 
purposes. This is because the common traveler response to an increased trip cost is to cut 
down on trips that are not absolutely necessary. People would only make those 
automobile trips that they value highly.  Peak hour trips in dense urban areas are less 
elastic with respect to trip costs and congestion delays because these trips are essential, 
usually to or from work. For the same reason, travel demand elasticities for weekends and 
weekdays are also usually different.  
 
Elasticities thus usually take several possible values, depending on the type of market, 
type of consumer and time period 96. For example, an elasticity value of car trips with 
respect to trip cost equal to –0.3, would actually vary between –0.1 and –0.6 depending 
                                                 
96 Victoria Transport Policy Institute (VTPI) web site at http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm11.htm. 
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on the type of trip (commercial, commute, recreational, etc.), the type of motorist (rich, 
poor, young, old, etc.), travel conditions (suburban, urban, peak, off-peak), and the time 
period being considered (short, medium or long-term)97. 
 
Automobile travel demand is believed to be inelastic with respect to most individual price 
components of driving such as fuel cost, parking charges, tolls, congestion charges, and 
so on, because they each represent a small portion of total user costs. For example, if the 
price of fuel is 20% of the total cost of driving, parking or congestion charges are 30%, 
time delays are 40% and maintenance costs are 10% of total driving costs, then a -0.2 
elasticity of driving with respect to congestion costs actually represents an elasticity of  -
0.67 with respect to total cost of driving. In addition, short-term elasticities that represent 
changes in demand within a two-year period of implementation of a policy are typically 
one-third of long-term demand elasticities observed 15 years or more after. Long-term 
elasticity values are always higher because people consider the effects of prices in taking 
longer term decisions, and there are always more alternatives they can explore. 
 
We will estimate the reduction in trips due to a congestion charge for an acceptable range 
of demand elasticities.  The elasticity values are considered for the short-term, and they 
illustrate the change in automobile trips and emissions for different sections of the 
population. Low income people are more price sensitive than high-income people, and 
thus their travel demand is typically more elastic. The common range of demand 
elasticites for a large urban area is between –0.1 to –0.6, and a congestion charge can be 
considered similar to any access toll commonly implemented. It has been found that 
people’s travel behavior is more likely to change if the cost per car trip is increased, such 
as in case of a toll or congestion charge, than if fuel prices or parking costs are increased.  
 
For example, the elasticity value for Seoul, Korea with respect to toll prices is –0.4598, 
and is higher than the elasticity with respect to fuel price. In another study done in Costa 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 Lee, S., Lee, Y.H. and J.H. Park (2002) 
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Rica99, the average demand elasticity with respect to an increase in cost per car trip was 
higher than that with respect to parking cost.  Both these elasticity values, however, were 
lower than the elasticity with respect to increase in automobile travel time. This shows 
that more trips are restrained by delays caused due to congested travel conditions than by 
an increased cost per car trip. 
 
Congestion charging is considered a viable policy only for areas where travel demand is 
relatively elastic because only then is a perceptible reduction in traffic achieved. For 
example, in London, before congestion charging was introduced, demand was considered 
less elastic than it actually was. With a charge of £5, it was predicted that there would be 
a 15% reduction in traffic coming into Central London, but the resulting reduction after 
six months of introduction of the charge was 30%. Actual demand was far more elastic, 
because over half the 30% of motorists who stopped driving in the charging hours 
switched to public transport100. 
 
In Singapore, the demand elasticity with respect to the congestion tolls lies between –
0.19 to –0.58, with an average of –0.34101. This value is lower than expected, considering 
the travel alternatives provided by the excellent public transportation system in 
Singapore. However, the value is low because the high car ownership taxes allow only 
higher income people to own cars, and these travelers are less sensitive to a price 
increase. This situation is similar in Mexico City where more middle and higher income 
people own cars. In fact, a similar value of –0.36102 has been estimated for Mexico City 
using data from the 1994 O-D survey.  One might be lower to some extent today. 
 
A sensitivity analysis was done for Mexico City using different values of demand 
elasticity to calculate the reduction in trips for different values of a central city congestion 
charge. Consistent with the assumptions in the regression analysis carried out earlier (see 
                                                 
99 Alpizar, F. and F. Carlsson (2001). 
100 Transport for London (2003). Congestion Charging: Six Months On. 
101 Victoria Transport Policy Institute (VTPI) 
102 A gravity model using data from the 1994 O-D survey estimated the ‘friction parameter’ to be equal to –
0.363.  This can be considered analogous to demand elasticity because it means that if the cost or distance 
between an origin and destination increased, the total number of trips made between the two zones would 
reduce by a multiple of the friction parameter. From Sussman and Gamas-Buentello (2004), draft paper. 
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Assumptions, section 4.2.), the cost of driving in 2004 was calculated for an average 
round-trip length of about 50 km (about 31 miles) per day and an average mileage of 10 
km per liter at a fuel price of 7 pesos per liter, the cost of driving was assumed to be 17.5 
pesos per trip. We added to that an average parking cost of 18 pesos per hour103. The O-D 
survey showed that the average duration of parking was 5 hours, hence adding 18*5=90 
pesos for parking, we get an average trip cost to the central areas to be 107.5 pesos. This 
was the base value of cost considered for the calculations below, and is a conservatively 
high estimate. A lower base value would only lead to a higher expected reduction in 
traffic.  
 
Using the O-D survey data, we know that the total number of daily car trips to the 21 
central distritos was 752,638 in 1994.  The Ministry of Transportation (Molina, et al 
2002) predicts a 25% increase in daily car trips by the year 2020, with all other mode 
shares held constant. A time series regression performed on these data allows us to 
estimate that at present, i.e. in 2004, the number of car trips to the central distritos must 
be 825,007, assuming an approximated linear growth in number of trips over the years. 
This is the base value of trips used for the calculations in the sensitivity analysis. 
TABLE  5-5 Percentage Reduction in Car and Taxi Traffic to Central Distritos, 
Based on Different Demand Elasticity and Congestion Charge Values 
      Value of Congestion Charge in Mexican Pesos       
Elasticity 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 
-0.5 14.0% 16.3% 18.6% 20.9% 23.3% 25.6% 27.9% 30.2% 32.6% 34.9% 37.2% 
-0.45 12.6% 14.7% 16.7% 18.8% 20.9% 23.0% 25.1% 27.2% 29.3% 31.4% 33.5% 
-0.4 11.2% 13.0% 14.9% 16.7% 18.6% 20.5% 22.3% 24.2% 26.0% 27.9% 29.8% 
-0.35 9.8% 11.4% 13.0% 14.7% 16.3% 17.9% 19.5% 21.2% 22.8% 24.4% 26.0% 
-0.3 8.4% 9.8% 11.2% 12.6% 14.0% 15.3% 16.7% 18.1% 19.5% 20.9% 22.3% 
-0.25 7.0% 8.1% 9.3% 10.5% 11.6% 12.8% 14.0% 15.1% 16.3% 17.4% 18.6% 
-0.2 5.6% 6.5% 7.4% 8.4% 9.3% 10.2% 11.2% 12.1% 13.0% 14.0% 14.9% 
-0.15 4.2% 4.9% 5.6% 6.3% 7.0% 7.7% 8.4% 9.1% 9.8% 10.5% 11.2% 
-0.1 2.8% 3.3% 3.7% 4.2% 4.7% 5.1% 5.6% 6.0% 6.5% 7.0% 7.4% 
 
The calculated reduction in car trips is shown above for different values of demand 
elasticity, considering a plausible range of congestion charge between 30 and 80 Mexican 
                                                 
103 Source: Alejandro Villegas – parking charges in the MCMA vary from 10-25 pesos per hour, with the 
higher end of the range fixed for the major commercial centers in the DF, including the central distritos. 
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Pesos (US $3-$8). It is evident that the reduction in trips is less for the higher income 
groups having lower price sensitivity, and the reduction in trips is more for the lower 
income groups with higher price sensitivity. Thus, we can further subdivide the range of 
plausible elasticity values into lowest income group (-0.5 to –0.4), middle income group 
(-0.35 to –0.25) and highest income group (-0.2 to –0.1). This subdivision is useful 
because it will help assess if congestion pricing in the area-based form we are considering 
will be a progressive policy or not.  
TABLE  5-6  Distribution of Households and Car Ownership in the MCMA by 
Income (2001) 
Income Group All Households Car Owning Households 
Low 1,420,105 37.22% 353,530 25.64%
Middle 1,858,573 48.71% 728,314 52.82%
High 536,540 14.06% 296,918 21.54%
Total 3,815,218 100.00% 1,378,762 100.00%
Minimum Wage in 2000 = 35.23 MXP 
  
Assumptions: 
Low Income = Up to 4 times minimum wage  
Middle Income = 5 to 20 times minimum wage 
High Income = Above 20 times minimum wage 
 
Performing the same analysis discussed before, but with calculation of revenues 
differentiated by income group, we find that the higher income households pay more 
towards the overall revenues than the middle or lower income households. The policy can 
therefore, be considered progressive in absolute terms, though it will be regressive at a 
household level. This is because the MCMA has a majority of households in the middle 
to low-income category, which would have to pay a larger proportion of household 
income towards a congestion charge if they continue to drive their cars. The richest car 
owners represent only 21.5% of all car owning households in the MCMA.   
 
Perhaps the important question to ask is will higher-income people pay the charge and 
continue to drive anyway? For example, a new toll road in Mexico City, running parallel 
to the Periferico, has a toll of 80 pesos and is used to only 6% of its capacity, while the 
Periferico remains highly congested. The problem in this case is that there is an 
alternative to paying the charge, which is driving on the congested road.  People do not 
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value the time they spend in delays on the Periferico as much as the toll of 80 pesos they 
would have to pay on the new road. In case of a central city congestion charge however, 
the alternative to paying the charge would be to use public transport. 
 
The sensitivity analysis shown in Table 5-7 is for a range of congestion charge 
considered feasible to implement, i.e. from 40 to 60 pesos. The weighted average of 
revenues and trip reductions is calculated, using the proportion of car owners in each 
income group as the weights.  We find that revenues for a lower charge and higher 
elasticity are similar to revenues obtained with a higher charge and lower demand 
elasticity. Even the lowest charge considered, i.e. 40 pesos, would generate average 
revenues of about 30 million MXP (US $3 million) per day. This translates to substantial 
annual revenues. It is thus evident that if an area-based pricing scheme could be made to 
work with political will and appropriate technology, a significant source of new funds 
could be created for reinvestment in public transport. 
TABLE  5-7  Daily Revenues and Percentage Reduction in Private Trips, by 
Income Group and Congestion Charge Value 
Charge Revenue Charge Revenue Charge Revenue Charge Revenue Charge Revenue
Income 
Group 
Demand 
Elasticity 40 
Million 
MXP 45 
Million 
MXP 50 
Million 
MXP 55 
Million 
MXP 60 
Million 
MXP 
Low -0.5 18.6% 26.9 20.9% 29.4 23.3% 31.7 25.6% 33.8 27.9% 35.7 
Low -0.45 16.7% 27.5 18.8% 30.1 20.9% 32.6 23.0% 34.9 25.1% 37.1 
Low -0.4 14.9% 28.1 16.7% 30.9 18.6% 33.6 20.5% 36.1 22.3% 38.5 
Medium -0.35 13.0% 28.7 14.7% 31.7 16.3% 34.5 17.9% 37.3 19.5% 39.8 
Medium -0.3 11.2% 29.3 12.6% 32.5 14.0% 35.5 15.4% 38.4 16.7% 41.2 
Medium -0.25 9.3% 29.9 10.5% 33.2 11.6% 36.5 12.8% 39.6 14.0% 42.6 
High -0.2 7.4% 30.5 8.4% 34.0 9.3% 37.4 10.2% 40.7 11.2% 44.0 
High -0.15 5.6% 31.2 6.3% 34.8 7.0% 38.4 7.7% 41.9 8.4% 45.4 
High -0.1 3.7% 31.8 4.2% 35.6 4.7% 39.3 5.1% 43.1 5.6% 46.7 
Average   11.2% 29.3 12.6% 32.5 14.0% 35.5 15.4% 38.4 16.7% 41.2 
Weighted Average  11.4% 29.2 12.8% 32.4 14.2% 35.4 15.7% 38.3 17.1% 41.0 
Revenues are shown in Million Mexican Pesos (MXP) 
 
Another value of elasticity to consider is that of demand with respect to travel time 
savings. Studies show that a majority of motorists are most sensitive to travel time, and 
that elasticity with respect to travel time is usually the highest. In London, a 30% 
reduction in the number of car trips to the congestion zone, resulted in a 14% increase in 
travel time savings in terms of minutes per kilometer due to higher traffic speeds. This 
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implies that the trip elasticity with respect to travel time savings was -1.8104. For Mexico 
City, this has been estimated to be –0.6 as a long-term value105. That is, a 6% reduction in 
car trips due to a congestion charge would result in an increase in average traffic speed 
that would cause a 10% increase in time savings. 
 
The following sensitivity analysis shows the reduction in traffic required in Mexico City 
for different values of desired increase in average traffic speed. The analysis is based on a 
demand elasticity value of –0.6 with respect to travel time savings calculated by Eskeland 
and Feyziglou (1997)106 . The numbers are generated for an average traffic speed of 20 
km/hr in the central areas of Mexico City107, and an assumed average travel distance of 25 
km which is only indicative. We see from Table 5-8 that a reduction in car trips to the 
city center by 12% can increase average traffic speed by 5 km/hr, and can reduce travel 
time by 20%. 
TABLE  5-8  Sensitivity Analysis: Demand with respect to Travel Time Savings 
Desired increase in 
average traffic speed 
(km/hr) 
Time savings for 
25-km distance 
(mins.) 
Percentage 
reduction in travel 
time 
Required 
reduction in trips 
Percentage 
Reduction in car 
trips required 
2 6.82 9.09% 41053 5.45% 
3 9.78 13.04% 58902 7.83% 
4 12.50 16.67% 10.00% 
5 15.00 20.00% 90317 12.00% 
6 17.31 23.08% 104211 13.85% 
8 21.43 28.57% 129024 17.14% 
10 25.00 33.33% 150528 20.00% 
75264 
 
Taking this analysis further, we can estimate the reduction in emissions from reduced car 
and taxi trips to the central distritos of the DF. We find that the maximum expected 
reduction in various pollutants is only a small percentage of the total in the metropolitan 
area.  
                                                 
104 Transport for London (2004). Impacts Monitoring: Second Annual Report - this was the elasticity value 
at the boundary of the congestion zone. The extended zone (define) had a much lower elasticity with 
respect to travel time savings = 0.75 approximately, with a 12.5% reduction in car trips. 
105 Eskeland, Feyzioglu and World Bank. Policy Research Dept. Public Economics Division. (1995) 
106 Ibid. 
107 Villegas-Lopez (2000) 
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TABLE  5-9  Emissions per vehicle in grams/year/vehicle108 
Vehicle Type No. of Vehicles NOx CO SO2 PM10 HC 
Private autos 2,341,731 20,233 351,226 854 299 34,891
Taxis 109,407 101,392 1,201,504 5,182 1,819 139,936
Source: Gilat (2002) 
 
TABLE  5-10   Emissions Inventory from Mobile Sources in the MCMA, 1998 
(Metric tons per year)109 
Vehicle Type No. of Vehicles NOx CO SO2 PM10 HC 
Private autos 2,341,731 47,380 822,477 2,000 701 81,705
Taxis 109,407 11,093 131,453 567 199 15,310
Combis (colectivos) 5,499 930 20,448 28 10 1,945
Microbuses (colectivos) 32,029 9,524 216,740 166 59 19,761
Pick up 336,080 18,961 255,503 522 183 24,599
Heavy-duty gasoline trucks 154,513 15,297 216,865 240 84 18,683
Diesel vehicles < 3 tons 4,733 150 249 24 133 168
Diesel tractor trailers 70,676 22,678 16,675 363 1,990 7,587
Diesel buses 12,505 11,640 9,270 214 1,174 3,853
Diesel vehicles > 3 tons 90,940 27,662 20,956 468 2,562 9,205
Heavy-duty LPG trucks 30,102 308 298 15 16 215
Motorcycles 72,704 215 22,729 63 22 4,742
Total Mobile Sources 3,260,919 165,838 1,733,663 4,670 7,133 187,773
Source: CAM (2001) 
 
Since we have considered short-term elasticity values only, we can assume that the 
calculated reduction in trips to the city center in the morning peak hour occurs in the 
course of a year. So assuming a base value of daily trips to the central disritos as before, 
equal to 825,007, and the same values of elasticity considered earlier, we can calculate 
the emissions saved by the reduction in trips. We also assume that one vehicle makes one 
trip to the city center per day in the morning peak hours from 7 AM to 10 AM. This again 
is a reasonable, though conservative estimate. It is equivalent to saying that we have 
reduced 825,007 vehicles from circulating in the city center by the end of one year of 
implementation of a congestion charge.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
108 Molina and Molina (2002) 
109 Ibid. 
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The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown below for a congestion charge value of 
60 pesos per day. The charge could of course be per trip, but this analysis follows the 
London model of a daily access charge to the central distritos of the DF. The weighted 
average amounts of pollutants in tons/year. 
TABLE  5-11  Savings in Emissions based on Demand Elasticity for a 60 Pesos 
Congestion Charge 
Charge     Emissions saved   Income 
Group 
Demand 
Elasticity 60 pesos NOx CO SO2 PM10 HC 
Low -0.5 27.91% 2,746 44,802 121 42 4,556
Low -0.45 25.12% 2,472 40,322 108 38 4,101
Low -0.4 22.33% 2,197 35,842 96 34 3,645
Medium -0.35 19.54% 1,922 31,362 84 30 3,190
Medium -0.3 16.74% 1,648 26,881 72 25 2,734
Medium -0.25 13.95% 1,373 22,401 60 21 2,278
High -0.2 11.16% 1,099 17,921 48 17 1,823
High -0.15 8.37% 824 13,441 36 13 1,367
High -0.1 5.58% 549 8,960 24 8 911
Weighted Average (tons/year) 1,682 27,433 74 26 2,790
Savings in Emissions (%) 1.01% 1.58% 1.58% 0.36% 1.49%
Maximum savings in emissions (%) 1.66% 2.58% 2.58% 0.59% 2.43%
 
The results show that the net effect on emissions reduction will be very small relative to 
emissions in the entire MCMA. However, we need to analyze this more accurately, 
relative to the emissions in the proposed congestion zone, which are the highest in the 
MCMA, according to CAM110. The figures on the next page show the highest 
concentrations of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons projected for the year 2010 in the 
central area of the DF. This is the area we have considered as a potential congestion zone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 PROAIRE: Programs to Improve Air Quality in the MCMA – 2002-2010 
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FIGURE 5-2 Distribution of CO Emissions in the MCMA projected for 2010 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5-3 Distribution of HC Emissions in the MCMA projected for 2010 
 
Source: PROAIRE: Programs to Improve Air Quality in the MCMA – 2002-2010 
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Disaggregated data on emissions inventory was not available. However, acknowledging 
that air pollution is a regional problem, this analysis gives some direction. It shows that 
congestion pricing is not expected to facilitate significant reduction in overall annual 
emissions as the proposed ‘congestion zone’ is small relative to the entire metropolitan 
area. Even in London, overall emissions reduction due to the congestion charging scheme 
has been low. However, in the central areas, congestion charging would help reduce daily 
average emissions in the zone, and would reduce the number of days the air quality 
targets are exceeded in Mexico City.  
 
It must be remembered that a congestion charging policy must specifically be 
implemented for reducing traffic gridlock, reducing travel delays, and increasing traffic 
speed. The revenues and emissions reduction can be considered bonus fallouts of the 
scheme and must be communicated to the stakeholders as such. 
 
The final chapter will present the conclusions of this thesis, along with possibilities for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS    
 
The eminent physicist Albert Einstein has said, “The significant problems we face cannot 
be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them.” 
With congestion being an ever-growing problem facilitated by growing car ownership 
and use, it is clear that we need to think beyond the solutions that have been deployed in 
previous decades. 
 
At a recent workshop in Mexico City111 that brought together government officials, 
academics, consultants and researchers, the topic of congestion pricing was raised in an 
open forum. The ensuing discussion showed that there is a considerable lack of 
understanding about the policy, even among decision-makers. Questions were raised 
about what a pricing measure should be called and what its emphasis should be, for 
example, congestion pricing, value pricing, rationing, control of externalities, an 
argument of fairness in transportation supply rather than efficiency, and so on. The 
discussion indicated a significant interest in the policy and confirmed the need for 
research. In this thesis, as a first step, we have examined the major issues that can lead to 
further inquiries for the local governments to pursue.  
 
A survey carried out in the Mexico City workshop emphasized the importance of 
institutional coordination for transportation activities, improvements in public transport 
before applying pricing, and beginning a process of public information. Based on this 
survey, and a study of other congestion pricing schemes around the world, we 
recommend a broad strategy for Mexico City, phased as follows: 
 
1)  To install parking meters in the central delegaciones of the Federal District (DF) 
while using the revenues from each delegacion for transport improvements in that 
delegacion. This is a proposal on the brink of implementation in the same destination 
area recommended as our ‘congestion zone’. In addition, to begin the process of 
                                                 
111 Seventh Annual Workshop of the Integrated Program on Urban, Regional and Global Air Pollution, 
Mexico City, January 18-21, 2004 
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public education regarding congestion costs while the new Bus Rapid Transit 
Corridors are constructed. We note that the installation of parking meters and 
construction of bus corridors is currently underway in the DF. 
2)  To engage stakeholders in studying different options for implementing congestion 
pricing, with due consideration to the costs, benefits, distributive impacts, and use of 
revenues in each scheme while improving and consolidating vehicle registration 
records. 
3) To consider required institutional changes, such as setting up an implementing 
authority that would be in charge of executing a pricing scheme when the decision is 
made in consensus with stakeholders. 
 
To pursue congestion pricing in any form, it is important to first understand the 
distribution of winners and losers from the policy.  The issue of equity is highly political, 
and one that will directly affect the feasibility of the policy. This is especially so because 
Mexico City has multiple jurisdictions and decision-making agencies, and each would 
seek a share of revenues while incurring least costs.  This conflict or competition between 
agencies is bound to undermine any efforts to cooperate.  Thus, the first step towards 
implementation of the phased strategy recommended here must be to ensure institutional 
coordination between the Federal District (DF) and the State of Mexico (EM).  
 
The survey results showed that government officials are reluctant to implement measures 
as drastic as congestion pricing before considering options for improving public 
transport, instituting parking charges, or creating physical restraints, such as 
pedestrianized streets. Other options such as installing parking meters and issuing 
penalties for illegal parking, removing taxi and colectivo stations from main streets, 
regulating the hours of operation of freight traffic, and regulating street vendors, were 
suggested instead of pricing. These are strategies that are relatively lower in cost, but 
require authoritative enforcement. We argue that these strategies can be implemented 
prior to pricing as they facilitate a consciousness about improving traffic congestion; 
however, a prime cause of congestion is growing use of private cars, and these measures 
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do not directly solve that problem. The views expressed through the survey are similar to 
those present in other cities before a congestion charge was introduced.  
 
Most respondents considered improving public transport as the best way to deal with 
congestion. It is essential to provide reliable public transport alternatives before 
considering pricing policies, so that lower income households that are priced out of using 
their cars do not suffer a loss in mobility. On the other hand, the chief mobility choice of 
lower income households, which is the colectivos, is not likely to change in the short 
term. While the colectivos do cause congestion, they provide a public transport service 
too, and suffer from the unreliability and travel delays associated with road congestion. 
Therefore, a congestion charge will also help public transport, by reducing travel delays 
on the city’s roads to speed up buses and colectivos.  
6.1. Estimated Impacts  
To understand the potential impacts of an area-based congestion charging scheme in the 
DF, we examined the factors influencing automobile use in the MCMA, with some 
estimates of reduction in traffic and emissions. Chapter 5 describes the results of the 
analysis. However, it is important to remember that the analysis is only illustrative since 
it uses data from 1994, which is too old to base current policy decisions on. Yet, we 
expect that the conclusions resulting from it will not change significantly, and that they 
would only become more strongly corroborated through current data. 
 
We found that for trips made in the morning peak, the use of private cars is most 
dependent on the average trip duration.  Trip duration, in turn is strongly affected by 
travel delays rather than the distance traveled. In spite of the fact that areas in the EM are 
farther from the central city and thus the trip cost for them would be higher, trip cost does 
not affect use of private cars in the EM. Private travel demand in the EM is less elastic 
than in the DF because of the fewer public transport options there. It was also observed 
that in the EM, the use of cars is more strongly correlated with household income than in 
the DF, possible because of the higher number of lower income people residing there.  
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From the regression coefficients, the approximate average elasticity value for travel 
demand with respect to trip cost was found to be –0.136, which is rather low, but not 
surprising given the disparity in access to public transport in the EM and the DF. Overall, 
the regression results showed that reducing travel delays for public transport modes such 
as colectivos and buses would be a key policy option to reduce car use from origins in the 
EM, followed by raising private trip costs. Congestion pricing will work in both these 
directions, and is thus worthwhile to consider.  
 
As regards the equity issues, a regression performed on those origin-destination pairs 
where public transport availability and use was significant, confirmed that household 
income did not play a role in automobile travel demand in those areas. The elasticity with 
respect to trip cost was also higher, and the correlation with trip duration was stronger. 
This confirmed that improving public transport would make congestion pricing more 
viable. However, efforts at initial surveying and modeling, and achieving stakeholder 
buy-in for congestion pricing are expected to take considerable time. Therefore, plans to 
enhance the image and services of public transport while communicating the motivations 
behind congestion pricing must occur side by side as part of an integrated transport 
strategy. 
6.2. Recommendations for Further Research 
The area-based charging option we examined in this thesis is of course, only one way to 
apply congestion pricing. The outer ring road, the Periferico in Mexico City, is already 
highly congested, and thus, a congestion zone that is bound only by the inner ring road 
may not necessarily serve the purpose.  We mentioned in chapter 3 that after the short-
term impacts of a central city congestion charge are experienced, the next stage could 
involve facility pricing on major roads leading to the city center, or expansion of the zone 
to include the outer ring road, the Periferico. 
 
In London, the central London congestion charging scheme began in a zone that covers 
about 1% of the Greater London area, with about 200,000 vehicles driving in per day 
before the charge was introduced. The zone we have described for Mexico City covers 
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about 2.5% of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area, with a projected 825,000 vehicles 
driving into the selected zone per day. The London scheme is considered the largest 
congestion charging operation in the world today. Thus, the charging option described 
here would in itself involve significant effort.  
In addition to area-based charging, other pricing options that can be investigated further 
for the MCMA are: 
 A flat increase in parking charges in congested central areas 
 Peak hour pricing in certain congested central zones 
 Increased parking charges only in peak hours 
 Tolling on Insurgentes Avenue – a key approach into the central city that will 
benefit from the Bus Rapid Corridor. 
 Charging differentially with discounts by income level (based on tax returns, 
expenditure level, and so on) would be a more sophisticated approach, however, it 
is recommended that a relatively simpler system be established first. 
 
For further research on congestion pricing in the MCMA it is imperative that a new 
origin-destination survey be done in order to ascertain the current mobility scenario.  It 
would facilitate more accurate network modeling and data analysis. In addition, a 
rigorous process of communication with all stakeholders must begin, so that the above 
different solutions to the congestion problem can be investigated. Surveying the concerns 
of different population groups, designing the incentives or disincentives they might 
receive as part of congestion pricing measures, and negotiating between them, are key 
topics of research in themselves, without which no pricing policy should be implemented. 
 
In addition, a regulatory measure in the form of the no-drive days already exists in 
Mexico City through the Hoy No Circula program112 started in 1989. Presumably, car 
owners in the middle and upper income classes may be more amenable to congestion 
pricing if it replaced the no-drive days because it would provide the choice to pay and 
drive. Since the higher income car owners are a lot more numerous, they may support the 
                                                 
112 See Chapter 4, section 4.3 
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policy if it substituted the Hoy No Circula. It is a line of reasoning not explored in this 
thesis, but one that can be studied further. 
6.3. Concerns Regarding Implementation 
In this research, we have done an initial study of relevant issues; yet, there are many 
questions we need to answer before planning implementation of congestion pricing in the 
MCMA. Some of these are as follows:  
 
  How high must a charge be set to see a perceptible decrease in traffic congestion? 
What is the most effective type of scheme and how would the monitoring and charge 
collection technology be deployed? 
 
  Considering a timeline of actions, such as Metro expansions, construction of bus 
corridors, restructuring of colectivo services, and so on, when is the best time to 
introduce congestion pricing?  How would the policy be sequenced along with other 
measures? 
 
  What steps can be taken to be well prepared for the problems encountered when a 
congestion charging scheme is introduced?   For example, in the area-based scheme 
recommended here, congestion may shift to parts outside the zone.  Public resistance, 
protests by colectivo operators and businesses may be other negative results that must 
be considered. 
 
As more groups of stakeholders are engaged, their conflicting interests would create more 
questions that need to be resolved. The major stakeholder groups would likely include the 
following: 
  Public sector agencies – COMETRAVI, SETRAVI, SCT, who would be responsible 
for the administrative, operational and enforcement costs, as well as allocation of the 
revenues to various activities 
  Taxi and colectivo operators, who would face an increase in operational expenses 
  All car owners, who would face increased trip costs 
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  Public transport riders, who would benefit from improvements in infrastructure, and 
from the hypothecation of revenues to investments in public transport 
  Truck drivers and freight operators, who would face increased business costs 
  Retail establishments and vendors in the DF, who would likely see reduced sales due 
to less recreational trips made by people 
  Residents in the congestion zone considered, as they would frequently make trips in 
and out of the zone 
 
There are many challenges that must be addressed before implementing congestion 
pricing in the Mexican context. In Mexico City, public perception regarding corruption in 
government is high, with a prevalent distrust of government motives. This is a major 
problem to overcome and is best tackled through extensive public information regarding 
the potential costs and benefits of pricing. A key lesson learned from many congestion 
pricing projects is that the rationale behind the policy must be communicated well to the 
public to ensure support. In addition, the system of decision-making as well as operations 
must be completely transparent. Decisions regarding the provision of alternative services, 
allocation of revenues, mitigation, and enforcement, must be made through negotiations 
between different interest groups, and only then must the proposal be communicated to 
the public. 
 
It is essential to know what percentage of low-income households in Mexico City own 
and use cars. Once this is determined, then different options to deal with the equity issue 
can be considered. There are various options for doing this, such as discounts based on 
income level, improvements in public transport, discounts on the particular roads or 
accesses that the majority of low-income people use, or progressively increasing charges 
for people owning two or more cars. The discounts have to be carefully structured 
because a congestion pricing scheme would be successful only if more people do not 
drive. Some believe that many low-income car drivers actually drive their employers’ 
cars, and thus would not directly bear the burden of a congestion charge. Therefore, data 
on who in fact accesses the city center, and for what purpose, is a necessary input to the 
design of any pricing scheme for the MCMA. 
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While modeling efforts are underway to assess the impacts on trips and mode shares, 
models usually are based on the assumption that all trips that would be priced out by a 
congestion charge would be redistributed in public transport. But there would be many 
trips that are altogether suppressed and cannot be made any more. These raise an 
important equity concern, yet would not be accounted for. It is necessary to also 
determine the current demand elasticity with respect to cost per trip in the MCMA, for 
which an elasticity study must be done.  
 
Another challenge is the fact that vehicle registration databases in Mexico City are 
unreliable, and are separate for the DF and the EM. This is bound to limit the technology 
choices that can be applied, and to make implementation difficult. An updated and 
unified registration database must be created before considering congestion pricing, as 
the mode of payment and charge collection will depend on it a great deal.  
 
The question of how to deal with the colectivos is important. In this thesis, we suggest 
that the colectivos be given discounts to acknowledge the public transport service they 
provide, while considering that they also cause much of the air pollution and congestion. 
While the proposed Bus Rapid Transit corridors are expected to replace the colectivos 
that run on those routes, it is essential to reorganize the colectivo services so they act as 
feeders to the metro and BRT systems. One strategy could be to discount the colectivo 
operators only if they agree to cooperate in these reorganizing efforts. 
 
We have mentioned earlier that different measures must be carefully sequenced as part of 
a package of options, which will include congestion pricing, public transport investments, 
and infrastructure improvements. In the particular case of Mexico City, road construction 
would need to be a part of these measures not to expand capacity, but because there are 
missing links in the network. The measures must be sequenced such that the benefits of 
most improvements are apparent before proposals for congestion pricing are publicly 
discussed.  
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On studying the key factors of success in schemes around the world, we find that it will 
be important to identify a high-profile project “champion”, who would likely be a 
prominent citizen. Such a person would be necessary to retain on-going dialogue with 
stakeholder groups, to raise awareness of the benefits of congestion pricing and lessons 
learned from existing schemes, to highlight proposals for public transport improvements 
made with the revenues, and to frame proposals in a manner that facilitates public 
acceptance. 
  
The issues discussed in this thesis suggest that it could take a few years to garner support 
for congestion charging in Mexico City among all stakeholder groups.  The design of the 
policy would be a less complicated task. The process of changing the mentality of car 
users so that they accept the costs of using private vehicles in congested areas, of 
engaging all stakeholders, of arriving at consensus among the different institutional 
bodies, building public support, and implementing congestion pricing in carefully 
sequenced phases along with public transport investments, is bound to take time.   
However, with a current vehicle fleet of about 3.5 million and with a current average 
annual growth rate of 7%, the number of vehicles will double in Mexico City in ten 
years’ time. Thus, serious planning for congestion pricing, with complementary measures 
must begin now. 
6.4. Final Word 
The aim of this thesis is to illustrate how congestion pricing may be applicable in the 
Mexico City Metropolitan Area, and to discuss the major issues surrounding the policy. 
Recognizing that congestion pricing must be part of an integrated transportation strategy, 
we hope that this work will be the beginning of further research and dialog regarding 
pricing measures to manage travel demand in Mexico City. Once more recent data 
becomes available, the sensitivity analysis presented in this thesis can serve as a model 
for estimating potential impacts of different types of congestion pricing schemes. Finally, 
the author hopes that this thesis prompts decision-makers to consider congestion pricing 
as a possible measure in their long-term transportation plans for Mexico City. 
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APPENDIX 1: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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APPENDIX 2: COMBINED REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Correlations and Descriptives Standardized Coefficients
REGRESSION ON VARIABLES PRIVATE DURATION COST INCOME Beta t-ratio Significance
All trips to central distritos DURATION 0.608 0.616 38.808 p < 0.01
COST -0.220 -0.006 -0.136 -7.702 p < 0.01
INCOME 0.211 -0.052 -0.437 0.184 10.422 p < 0.01
Mean 0.29 27.76 0.97 35133.45 Adjusted R2 0.443 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 2219 Std. Deviation 0.33 30.01 0.58 41298.98 Standard Error 0.247
Correlations and Descriptives Standardized Coefficients
REGRESSION ON VARIABLES PRIVATE DURATION COST INCOME Beta t-ratio Significance
Trips from origins in the EM DURATION 0.736 0.711 31.247 p < 0.01
COST -0.131 -0.073 -0.042 -1.84 p = 0.066
INCOME 0.280 0.114 -0.191 0.19 8.222 p < 0.01
Mean 0.23 28.34 1.38 16738.34 Adjusted R2 0.581 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 822 Std. Deviation 0.34 37.03 0.59 13732.19 Standard Error 0.221
Trips from origins in the DF DURATION 0.522 0.548 25.144 p < 0.01
COST -0.197 0.053 -0.153 -6.344 p < 0.01
INCOME 0.176 -0.106 -0.436 0.167 6.908 p < 0.01
Mean 0.33 27.42 0.72 45957.20 Adjusted R2 0.344 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 1397 Std. Deviation 0.32 24.98 0.41 47775.77 Standard Error 0.258
DURATION 0.742 0.725 30.114 p < 0.01
COST -0.104 -0.051 -0.056 -2.325 p = 0.02
INCOME 0.218 0.096 -0.075 0.144 5.968 p < 0.01
Mean 0.21 26.71 1.61 14985.04 Adjusted R2 0.573 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 745 Std. Deviation 0.34 38.34 0.48 11829.65 Standard Error 0.220
DURATION 0.640 0.622 34.505 p < 0.01
COST 0.195 -0.067 -0.093 -4.674 p < 0.01
INCOME 0.234 0.083 -0.430 0.142 7.128 p < 0.01
Mean 0.26 28.23 1.06 16609.15 Adjusted R2 0.448 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 1714 Std. Deviation 0.32 31.31 0.57 8507.88 Standard Error 0.235
DURATION 0.594 0.662 18.899 p < 0.01
COST -0.109 0.239 -0.225 -5.29 p < 0.01
INCOME 0.074 * -0.197 -0.588 0.072 1.705 p = 0.089 *
Mean 0.41 26.1629 0.6505 98006.0079 Adjusted R2 0.420 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 505 Std. Deviation 0.35 25.04611 0.49078 46175.94603 Standard Error 0.269
Correlations and Descriptives Standardized Coefficients
REGRESSION ON VARIABLES PRIVATE DURATION COST INCOME Beta t-ratio Significance
DURATION 0.797 0.774 46.685 p < 0.01
COST -0.307 -0.162 -0.157 -8.745 p < 0.01
INCOME 0.107 -0.025 -0.380 0.068 3.818 p < 0.01
Mean 0.04 12.33 1.11 27604.37 Adjusted R2 0.671 p < 0.01
No. of observations = 1241 Std. Deviation 0.08 24.32 0.60 35139.89 Standard Error 0.044
Trips between O-D pairs with 
distance >10m
Trips from origins having 
above average income per 
capita
Trips from origins having 
below average income per 
capita
Trips from all origins having 
high public transport mode 
share
(low availability of public 
transport)
(high availability of public 
transport)
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF CORE, INNER, AND OUTER DELEGACIONES IN THE DF 
 
Refer Figure 2-3 for population distribution  
   
Core  
Cuauhtemoc  
Miguel Hidalgo  
   
Inner  
Azcapotzalco  
Benito Juarez  
Gustavo A. Madero  
Ixtacalco  
Venustiano Carranza  
   
Outer  
Alvarado Obregon  
Coyocan  
Cuajimalpa  
Iztapalapa  
Magdalena Contreras  
Milpa Alta  
Tiahuac  
Tlalpan  
Xochimilco  
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APPENDIX 4: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 
 
 
In Mexico: 
 
Marcela Adriana Basurto Acevedo, SETRAVI 
Rafael Nunez Bandera, STC (Metro) 
José Flores Estrada, STC (Metro) 
Prof. Luis Miguel Galindo, UNAM 
Prof. José Luisa Lezama, El Colegio de Mexico 
Leonardo Martinez, Universidad IberoAmericana 
Sergio Sanchez, SEMARNAT 
Joel Ahumada Vargas, SETRAVI 
Mr. Alejandro Villegas-Lopez, INE-SEMARNAT 
 
In London: 
 
Nick Fairholme, Policy Manager - Congestion Charging, Transport for London 
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